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INTRODUCrION
A MERICANS have interesting and somewhat puzzling atti-
tudes about the state's role in defining and enforcing family
obligations. Most people view lasting marriage as an important
part of their life plans and take the commitment of marriage very
seriously. Yet any legal initiative designed to reinforce that com-
mitment generates controversy and is viewed with suspicion in
many quarters. For example, covenant marriage statutes,' which of-
fer couples entering marriage the option of undertaking a modest
marital commitment, are seen by many observers as coercive and
regressive measures rather than ameliorating reforms.
The law tends to reflect-and perhaps contributes to-this wari-
ness about legal commitment in marriage. No-fault divorce law
I See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-901-25-906 (West 2000); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
9:224(C), 9:225(A)(3), 9:234, 9:245(A)(1), 9:272-275, 9:307-309 (West 2000). The
Louisiana law allows couples contemplating marriage to choose between marriage
regulated under conventional divorce law and covenant marriage, which allows
divorce on fault grounds or after two years' separation. Since the existing statute
included some fault grounds, the primary differences are the required premarital
counseling and the default two-year separation ground for divorce.
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signals that marriage is a transitory commitment, one that is easily
set aside. Moreover, there is continuing reluctance to permit
spouses to use private agreements to reinforce their marital com-
mitment. Few courts, for example, would enforce a premarital
agreement incorporating covenant marriage terms.'
In the business context, in contrast, legal enforcement of recip-
rocal promises is routine and uncontroversial. It is well understood
that the availability of legal enforcement expands the freedom of
contracting parties by offering them the option of a binding com-
mitment. Contract promotes cooperation by reinforcing informal
social norms of reciprocity and discouraging opportunistic behavior.
Thus, it protects (and encourages) investment in the relationship to
the mutual benefit of the contracting parties? But even though the
metaphor of marriage as a contract is well established, many peo-
ple shy away from applying these lessons to marriage At the same
time, a divorce rate of fifty percent suggests that informal norms
are often not successful in sustaining cooperation in marriage. As
Russell Hardin put it, "[I]f contracts become as shaky as marriage,
then our society will be in danger of collapse."5 Contracts are not as
unstable as marriage, in part because the parties understand that
the commitment will be legally enforced. Why then is legal com-
mitment associated with choice in contract, but with coercion in
marriage?
A simple explanation of the puzzle is that regulation of family
relationships is the domain of social norms and not of formal legal
enforcement. Thus, the argument goes, the law does not (and per-
haps should not) regulate behavior in intimate relationships. This
response has some truth, but ultimately it is unsatisfactory. Legal
2See Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual
Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 879, 901-04 (1988); Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey
Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73
Ind. L.J. 453,454-55,462-63 (1998).
3 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L.
Rev. 261, 267 (1985); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2024-30, 2040-42 (1987) [hereinafter Scott, Conflict
and Cooperation].
4 See Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 180, 190-92 (10th ed. 1930); Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225,
1227-28 (1998).
5 Russell Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 Ethics 26, 35 (1996).
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regulation of family obligations is both accepted and effective in
some contexts. For example, although parental responsibilities in
intact families are generally regulated by informal social norms, the
law prescribes minimal parental duties and intervenes readily when
parents deviate from accepted norms.' Further, legal reforms de-
signed to reinforce desirable social norms of parental obligation,
such as the recent child support enforcement legislation, have been
at least somewhat effective and relatively uncontroversial.' So it
would seem that sometimes the law functions usefully as a "norm
manage[r],"8 reinforcing norms of family obligation, and that at
other times norm management efforts meet resistance and are inef-
fective (as many people predict will be the fate of the covenant
marriage laws).
Marriage is thus a particularly fertile environment in which to
explore the influence of law on norms, a subject attracting much in-
terest in the legal literature. Legal scholars have tended to analyze
the state's role in shaping norms in terms of isolated rules directed
at discrete social problems such as littering or smoking in public
places. In the domain of marriage, however, law and social norms
have been intricately interwoven to form a complex scheme of so-
cial regulation. Traditional law reinforced and prescribed both
gender norms and commitment norms in marriage. Gender norms
prescribed hierarchical and differentiated roles for husbands and
wives, while commitment norms defined marriage as a cooperative
relationship of lifelong obligation. The law also privileged marriage
and stigmatized other intimate relationships. This duality rein-
forced the elevated social status of marriage. At the same time, the
legal responsibilities of marriage, the barriers to exit, and the sub-
stantive fault grounds for divorce made marriage a serious
business. Thus, the willingness to make the legal commitment was
a powerful signal of good intentions to the other party and to the
6The law preempts parental authority in some areas, requiring compulsory school
attendance and restricting child labor. When parents deviate from minimum
standards of care, state agents intervene under child abuse laws. See infra notes 23-
27, 63-67 and accompanying text.
7 Beginning in the mid-1980s, a complex network of federal and state legislation has
contributed to more effective child support enforcement. See infra notes 124-130 and
accompanying text.
8 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 907 (1996).
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community.9 Although the relative impact of law and norms in
shaping expectations about marital behavior cannot be quantified,
it is uncontroversial that the institution of normative marriage is
defined in important ways by its legal framework."
This legal framework has undergone major adjustments in re-
cent years. First, the law has embraced egalitarian gender norms,
categorically withdrawing support from hierarchical, differentiated
marital roles. Beyond this, a substantial portion of the legal frame-
work of marriage has been dismantled through reforms that can
fairly be described as deregulation of marital commitment norms.
Deregulation deserves more attention than it has received from
norms scholars because it illuminates the ways that legal reforms
affecting social norms can have unanticipated (and sometimes un-
desirable) consequences. Thus, for example, no-fault divorce law-
conceived as a modest modernizing reform-effectively abolished
concrete rules of marital commitment, leaving the standard of be-
havior to be interpreted by spouses themselves. This legal move,
together with the trend toward deprivileging marriage, may have
inadvertently undermined beneficial norms that contributed to
marital stability.
It is clear that traditional family law reinforced commitment
norms and that they have become much weaker in the no-fault
era-in part as an unintended consequence of legal reform. It is
less clear, however, whether any legal corrective would be effective
or beneficial. Although the commitment norms and gender norms
that regulate the marriage relationship are analytically distinct,
they became interwoven (perhaps inextricably) and embedded in
traditional spousal roles. Thus, efforts to reintroduce legal en-
forcement of spousal commitment-such as covenant marriage-
are presumed by opponents to be associated with regressive social
policies and gender stereotypes. In contrast, legal enforcement of
commitment norms that define parental obligation has not trig-
9 Several scholars have applied signaling theory to the analysis of marriage. See
William Bishop, 'Is He Married?': Marriage As Information, 34 U. Toronto L.J. 245
(1984); Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in The Fall and Rise of
Freedom of Contract 256, 259-62 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Michael J. Trebilcock,
Marriage as a Signal, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, supra, at 245.
10 See Steven L. Nock, Marriage in Men's Lives 23 (1998). Nock describes domestic
relations law as an embodiment of collective ideals about marriage. See id. He uses
law as one basis for defining the institution of normative marriage. See id. at 41.
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gered associations with the inequity and coercion of traditional
marital roles, a difference that may facilitate the positive response
to the legal regulation of parenting.
The "bundling" of gender and commitment norms in marriage
points to a more general obstacle to the state functioning as a norm
manager in the family context. Marriage has become a battle-
ground in the culture wars, pitting cultural and religious
conservatives against political liberals and feminists. This polariza-
tion tends to silence the expression of intrinsic preferences by
individuals who seek to avoid informal sanctions.1 In an environ-
ment in which public discourse tends to mask private preferences,
predicting responses to legal policy initiatives becomes highly
problematic. I will suggest that the response to covenant marriage
(and to other family law reforms) may reflect this dynamic. Thus,
while it is possible to tell a plausible story about the law's past in-
fluence on the social norms surrounding marriage, predictions
about the impact of future legal reforms are far more uncertain.
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I will develop a taxon-
omy of marital norms and of the mechanics of norm enforcement
that clarifies the complex scheme of normative regulation. In Part
II, I will suggest the means by which law can affect marital norms,
using the traditional legal framework as a case study. Part III will
trace the modem social history of marriage through the evolution
of marital norms and the dramatic changes in the legal regulation
of the marital relationship. Using this analytic framework, in Part
IV, I will argue that norm bundling explains the puzzling variations
in the effects of the legal reform movement on contemporary mari-
tal norms. I will conclude that the complexity of the interaction of
law and norms in marriage, together with the problem of disguised
preferences, frustrates efforts to use explanatory theories of how
law influences norms to predict the consequences of future changes
in the legal regulation of marriage.
"For an enlightening analysis of how preference disguise makes the prediction of
social change difficult, see Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social
Consequences of Preference Falsification 247,256 (1995).
1906 [Vol. 86:1901
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I. THE NORMATVE STRUCrURE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
Marriage is a status in which a couple, usually through a formal
ceremony, agrees to be subject to a complex set of behavioral ex-
pectations defining the roles of spouse and parent, expectations
that will restrict their freedom and guide their behavior in the rela-
tionship. Although other roles in life involve a similar formal
change in status accompanied by voluntary agreement to be bound
by a set of norms, few are as broad in scope or as commonly ex-
perienced as marriage." As in other norm contexts, the social
norms surrounding marriage create in the individual spouse a sense
of obligation to behave as expected, stimulated in part by the rec-
ognition that violations result in sanctions in the form of both self-
imposed guilt and of disapproval by the spouse and other members
of the community.'" The way in which these norms function is both
interdependent and complex. To appreciate this complexity and its
consequences, I will develop in this Part a taxonomy of the norms
that gave traditional marriage its social meaning and of the mecha-
nisms by which marital norms are enforced.
A. A Taxonomy of Marital Norms
The set of norms that the spouses adopt and by which they agree
to be bound in traditional marriage includes both commitment
,
2 Entering military service or becoming president are similarly all-encompassing
roles that are formally assumed.
,3The definition of "social norm" has not been free from controversy. Some of the
debate focuses on whether conventions or behavioral regularities constitute norms.
See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1656-57
(1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 350-51 (1997). Richard McAdams's definition is simple, but
satisfactory, for my purposes. "[N]orms... refer[] to informal social regularities that
individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because
of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both." Id. at 340. Creation of a sense of
obligation to behave as expected is the key attribute, in my view, together with the
expectation of informal community enforcement. Norms also are often, but not
always, self-enforced through guilt. I do not include conventions in my definition of
norms. Thus, the conventions and traditions surrounding marriage-the wedding
ceremony and reception; announcements; and wedding and engagement rings, for
example-are not norms, because noncompliance carries no sanction. These
conventions and traditions are important symbolically and have a signaling function-
but, in my view, they are not norms. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
2000] 1907
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norms and gender norms, which together regulate both the spousal
and the parental roles." Spousal commitment norms prescribe the
general obligations of spouses to one another, while a somewhat
different set of commitment norms define parental obligations.
Commitment norms deter selfish behavior and encourage the
alignment of individual interest with that of the spouse or child.
Gender norms regulate the roles of women as wives and mothers
and of men as husbands and fathers. There is substantial overlap in
the obligations created by commitment and gender norms, which
have historically been intricately intertwined. I argue, however,
that the two types of norms are quite different in both function and
utility. Commitment norms assist the couple in achieving their mu-
tual goal of a lasting, cooperative, intimate relationship, and
motivate both spouses to act in their children's interest. The utility
of gender norms is tenuous; they have tended to reinforce women's
dependency, and to structure marriage as a relationship that serves
the interests of husbands, but subordinates that of wives. Commit-
ment norms are essential to successful marriage, as it is
conventionally understood, while gender norms for the most part
are, or should be, severable and expendable.
1. Commitment Norms
a. Spousal Commitment Norms
Spousal commitment norms restrict individual freedom for the
purpose of discouraging selfish behavior and encouraging each
spouse to identify her own interest with that of the other. At the
outset, I assume that commitment norms regulate the behavior of
husbands and wives evenhandedly-that is, each spouse voluntarily
agrees (by getting married) to be bound by the same behavioral re-
strictions, and each will be subject to similar sanctions for violation.
I also assume that, although the couple customizes the social norms
regulating marriage to some extent, the commitment framework
creates a template of standards and rules that generally guides
marital behavior. This is not to say that commitment norms func-
tion as an onerous burden, coercively imposed on the married
14 Note that this taxonomy categorizes norms in traditional marriage, and thus is the
historic baseline against which norm change is examined. As will become clear,
although I use the present tense, it is not meant to describe contemporary marriage.
1908 [Vol. 86:1901
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couple by an intrusive community. To the contrary, these mechanisms
are assumed voluntarily and function to promote cooperation in mar-
riage; they assist the couple to achieve their ambitious goal of a
mutually satisfying, lasting, intimate relationship. Indeed, a hypo-
thetical couple, presented with the task of devising a set of
behavioral expectations designed to optimize the prospect of suc-
cessful marriage, would likely replicate the existing collection of
commitment norms.
The couple entering marriage faces a significant challenge, despite
their emotional bond and firm resolution that their relationship will
endure. Each believes that the marriage will serve individual long-
term interest and that the prospect of a happy life together prom-
ises substantial payoffs. Both understand, however, that investing
substantial financial and emotional resources in a single, exclusive,
long-term relationship is a risky venture. They know that each will
be tempted many times to behave in ways that undermine the sta-
bility of the marriage, and they believe that selfish behavior,
although it sometimes promotes individual short-term interest,
threatens their mutual and individual long-term interest-and their
marriage.
If this is a plausible account of the dilemma facing the couple
contemplating marriage, then commitment norms represent a re-
sponse that allows the couple to make credible commitments to one
another, reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior and defection.
These norms function as both precommitment and commitment."
They reinforce the intentions of each spouse to behave cooperatively;
they also provide security for the marital investment through the
assurance that the other spouse is similarly bound. Some commit-
ment norms are marital expressions of standards of behavior much
like those that promote cooperation in long-term commercial or
social relationships-norms of reciprocity, solidarity, loyalty, hon-
esty, and trustworthiness. 6 The marital obligation is more extensive
1- Precommitments are self-command strategies, which allow individuals to act
according to their self-defined long-term interests. See Thomas C. Schelling, Self-
Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 Am. Econ.
Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 1 (1984); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About
Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9, 40 (1990). Commitments are enforceable
promises to other persons.
16 Several scholars have examined the operation of these norms in long-term
commercial relationships. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
2000] 1909
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than that of business partners or friends, of course, reflecting the
broader scope and intimacy of the relationship. For example, loy-
alty is expected of business partners, but loyalty in marriage
requires giving the highest priority to the relationship, with the ex-
pectation that it will last for life. Other marital norms encourage
sexual fidelity, openness, emotional sharing, and altruism. These
norms are less important or are irrelevant in the commercial con-
text; they create behavioral expectations that distinguish the
intimate and personal nature of marriage and promote its stability.
Commitment norms express, as general standards of behavior,
what each spouse can expect of the other, as well as guidelines for
self-management. Often, these broad norms also are particularized
in concrete behavioral rules. 7
Commitment norms serve a bonding function, in that each
spouse, by agreeing to adhere to the behavioral expectations em-
bodied in the norms, becomes vulnerable to heavy costs should he
or she later defect. 8 For example, marriage is subject to norms of
open communication and truth telling. These norms promote trust
and interdependence that reinforce the emotional bond, but which
can be expected to exacerbate the disruption of divorce. The shar-
ing of intimate personal information serves another bonding
function, with each spouse holding the other's secrets hostage and
both anticipating that disclosure (in a divorce proceeding, for ex-
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115
(1992); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 3, at
2040-42.
17 For example, concrete social norms encourage spouses to avoid extramarital sex;
to share financial resources, household tasks, time, and private thoughts; to keep
family secrets, to support each other in sickness and adversity; to remember
anniversaries and birthdays; and to forgive and forget hurt feelings and arguments.
18 Bonding arrangements are self-limiting constraints that align the interests of each
spouse with the other by increasing the costs of defection. Monitoring mechanisms, on
the other hand, facilitate detection and sanctioning by each spouse of norm violations
by the other. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308
(1976) (describing the use of bonding and monitoring arrangements to reduce agency
costs by managers). The precommitment function is important but under-emphasized.
Many persons entering marriage aspire to be good spouses (because they love the
other spouse, want a happy marriage, because it is consistent with their self image,
etc.), but realize that they will be tempted to stray from their self-defined goals. See
Scott, supra note 15, at 42-44. Norms assist them to stay the course.
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ample) would be costly.19 Communication and honesty also facili-
tate mutual monitoring by encouraging disclosure and information
sharing between spouses. If silence and non-disclosure are assumed
to be unusual behavior, they may be expected to trigger spousal
scrutiny.
Similarly, by promising to "forsake all others," each spouse
agrees to be bound by the norm of sexual fidelity. The mandate to
treat marriage as a sexually exclusive relationship prohibits the
spousal behavior that is assumed to represent the greatest threat to
maintaining a cooperative equilibrium in marriage. The broad be-
havioral standard prescribing marital fidelity has been stable over
time, but its boundaries have been defined through concrete rules
that have varied in different time periods and social contexts." Not
surprisingly, social disapproval of marital infidelity has tradition-
ally been strong and widespread." Thus, the spouse who is tempted
to pursue an illicit encounter anticipates that she will incur signifi-
cant costs should the adulterous violation be detected.' Moreover,
because of the widely shared consensus that adultery is bad behav-
ior, the potential defector can expect both spousal and community
monitoring, which increases the prospect of detection.
Assessment of the social welfare effects of spousal commitment
norms requires some simplifying assumptions. Conformity with
these norms will sometimes be inconsistent with short-term inter-
est-hence, the temptation to act selfishly. However, if enhancing
- See Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 1290-91. Disclosures of unflattering
information shared by spouses during marriage are a distasteful part of divorce
proceedings, as they seem to be motivated by spite. Ex ante, however, the risk of
disclosure makes the communication of the secret an act of trust, and serves as a
credible precommitment. Sharing secrets can function as self-enforcing contract
terms, where the penalty is triggered by the breach.
20 See Nock, supra note 10, at 22. The boundaries of the norm have been quite
variable. For example, for wives, different rules regulate flirting, the meaning of
socializing with other men, appropriate attire, etc., depending on whether the context
is a Hasidic community, Manhattan in the 1990s, or the Midwest in the 1890s.
2"See id. Surveys have shown Americans view extramarital sex as "more
reprehensible" than most other types of sex. Id. Indeed, 77% of Americans view
extramarital sex as "always wrong." Id. It is true, of course, that sanctions have varied
in different historical periods and social groups.
" These costs include feelings of guilt from internalization of the norm, together
with the sanction imposed by the spouse and the likely disapproval of friends and
family. Moreover, the efforts to escape detection induce psychological costs
associated with furtive, sneaky behavior.
2000] 1911
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the security and stability of the relationship is consistent with indi-
vidual and joint long-term interests, then commitment norms can
be said to enhance social welfare. This condition may often hold.
If, however, individual long-term interest is not furthered by the
normative constraints, the case for the efficiency of these commit-
ment norms becomes weaker.
b. Norms of Parental Obligation
Traditionally, marriage was the only socially acceptable venue
for producing and raising children, and, even today, the prospect of
having a child will often lead cohabiting couples to marry.' The pa-
rental role is assumed to be an important part of marriage, and
married couples are expected to have children (unless they marry
later in life).24 Parental commitment norms include the shared obli-
gations of parents to rear the children of the marriage to healthy
productive adulthood. Parents are obligated to feed, clothe, shel-
ter, discipline, socialize, educate, support, and love their children
and to protect them from harm.
Primary responsibility for many parenting tasks traditionally was
allocated on a gendered basis, with residual responsibility in the
other parent. Norms of parental obligation, like spousal commit-
ment norms, are expressed in broad behavioral standards that are
particularized through behavioral rules that may change over time.
Changes may reflect new information about child development,
which makes the older rule seem inefficient or harmful. For exam-
ple, parents of an earlier generation were unlikely to involve
themselves with their children's athletic activities or homework,
while modem parents feel guilty for missing a soccer game, believ-
21 See infra note 76. Out-of-wedlock parenthood was a serious social offense until
relatively recently, creating stigma for both the parent and the child. Illegitimate
children also suffered from serious legal disabilities, having no inheritance rights and
no entitlement to paternal support. See Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights,
Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 67-70 (1995). Both the stigma of unmarried parenthood and its
responsibilities fell heavily on mothers. Traditionally, unmarried fathers were
absolved of legal duties toward their children.
24Nock suggests that one of the defining traits of normative marriage is the
assumption that the couple will have children. See Nock, supra note 10, at 6. This
assumption is usually realized. According to Nock, only 11% of ever-married women
age 44 are childless. See id. at 32.
1912 [Vol. 86:1901
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ing that such involvement provides psychological benefits to the
child."
Like spousal commitment norms, norms of parental obligation
function to deter selfish behavior, encouraging parents to identify
their own interests with those of their children. These norms serve
an important function, because the relationship is one in which the
parents have power and authority over children who, because of
their immaturity, are unable to assert their own interests.' In this
context, as in the spousal relationship, social norms reinforce bonds
of emotional attachment to reduce conflicts of interest and encour-
age long-term investment in the relationship. These norms are
usually deeply internalized, and failure to adequately perform gen-
erates substantial feelings of guilt. Evidence of poor parenting (as
when children are unsupervised, badly behaved, dirty, or under-
nourished) also generates criticism and social sanctions by
neighbors and other community members. Monitoring parental
behavior is difficult, however, because children usually are not able
to monitor or sanction violations themselves, and deference to
family privacy impedes comnunity monitoring.27 Thus, successful
norm enforcement in this context depends heavily on bonding, and
particularly on the internalization by parents of their commitment
to child rearing.
In general, parental commitment norms serve the beneficial so-
cial function of promoting adequate care for children. They also
further an important individual and collective goal that is shared by
25 They also may be subject to gossip by other parents if they regularly fail to attend
(or admired for faithful attendance). Similarly, faithful performance of the obligation
to provide for the healthy physical development for children now requires regular
visits to the pediatrician and dentist for preventive examinations.
26 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev.
2401 (1995). The relationship between parents and children presents a problem
familiar in the regulation of agents in the commercial context. In other contexts
involving analogous power imbalance between principals and agents (such as trust
beneficiary and trustee or shareholders and directors), norms of fiduciary obligation
encourage the agent to identify her interest with that of the principal.
27 Monitoring does play a role as the parent anticipates that spouses and neighbors
may detect violations either by observing parental behavior directly, or indirectly by
observing the children. Child abuse reporting statutes encourage neighbors, teachers,
and others to monitor parents' behavior and report gross deficiencies. See, e.g., Ala.
Code § 26-14-3 (Supp. 1999); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620 (West Supp. 1999); Cal.
Penal Code § 11172 (West 1999).
2000] 1913
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spouses in many marriages-the successful rearing of children. By
deterring parents from selfish behavior and encouraging faithful
performance, these norms promote parents' utility and enhance so-
cial welfare.
2. Gender Norms
Gender norms created sharply differentiated spousal and paren-
tal roles in traditional marriage. Women have been held primarily
responsible for child care and homemaking tasks, while men were
(and are) expected to provide primary financial support for their
families.' Gendered spousal roles were hierarchical. The husband
was the head of the household, with primary authority over its re-
sources, location, and general governance decisions. An array of
marital norms encouraged the husband to exercise authority in the
family ("wearing the pants," as it were) and the wife to submit
cheerfully and to provide domestic services to her husband so that
he could successfully fulfill his breadwinner role. Gendered paren-
tal norms are more complicated. Mothers raising their children
performed an important and respected social function, which gave
them authority in the family. This role also contributed to inequal-
ity in marriage, however, because it reinforced women's financial
dependency on their husbands. 9 The "good" wife and mother de-
voted her efforts to serving her family's needs, subordinating her
own interests and preferences, while the "good" husband equated
his family's interests with the fulfillment of his individual wage
earner goals. Further, as I will argue below, the wife's dependency
and husband's autonomy functioned to bind them differentially to
the marriage, indirectly skewing the application of spousal com-
281 describe gender norms as part of traditional marriage and thus use the past
tense. These norms, of course, continue to shape roles in contemporary marriage. See
Nock, supra note 10, at 58-59; Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market:
Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 Va. L. Rev. 509 (1998).
Ultimately, mothers' responsibility for child care has been the principle obstacle
to equality with men in the workforce (and thus economic and political equality).
Joan Williams argues persuasively that radical reform of the model of the "ideal
worker" is necessary for real change. Currently, the role of ideal worker presumes
minimal family responsibilities, making the role one that many mothers cannot fulfill.
See Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to
Do About It (2000).
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mitment norms, and resulting in greater restrictions on the free-
dom of wives than of husbands.
Are gender norms efficient? Like other marital norms, gender
norms regulate behavior to encourage spouses to fulfill the obliga-
tions of their marital roles faithfully. From one perspective, role
division promises efficiency as each spouse invests human capital in
developing the skills associated with a narrow range of functions.'
The efficiency of divided roles is undermined if the stability of the
marriage becomes uncertain, however, because much of the wife's
investment is not transferable to productive roles outside the mar-
riage: Efficiency aside, the fairness of gender norms and roles is
questionable. Unlike commitment norms, gender norms either in-
herently or implicitly tend to subordinate the interests of wives to
those of husbands and subject spouses to unequal treatment.
Spousal and parental commitment norms can be understood as
mechanisms that predictably might evolve by spousal agreement
because they serve the mutual objectives of the parties. In contrast,
it is difficult to understand why parties in a Rawlsian original posi-
tion, ignorant of their future assigned gender roles, would agree to
gender norms (especially spousal gender norms) in marriage."
Gender norms were closely interwoven with commitment norms
in defining the traditional roles of husband and wife. This "bun-
dling" of norms is most obvious in the context of parental obligation,
where most responsibility fell on mothers; fathers' duties, aside from
financial support, were residual. Spousal commitment norms were not
formally gendered, but in a variety of ways, they functioned to con-
strain the behavior of wives more than husbands. Sometimes the
threatened sanction was disproportionately harsher for wives than
30 Gary Becker and other economists have argued for the efficiency of gendered role
division in marriage. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 14-37 (1981);
Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 . Legal Stud. 35, 40 (1978); see also
Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 40-48 (1989) (noting
both the economic rationality of such specialization, as well as its inherent dangers for
women).
3" Gender norms do not seem to reflect the efficiency and welfare-enhancing quality
that norms scholars predict will characterize informal social control mechanisms that
solve community collective action problems. Rather, they may represent another
category identified by sociologists and anthropologists-norms that emerge to serve
the interests of powerful groups in society. See Jean Ensminger & Jack Knight,
Changing Social Norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy, 38
Current Anthropology 1, 4-5, 11-14 (1997).
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husbands. For example, violation of the norm of sexual fidelity car-
fled far higher social costs for women than for men. 2 More subtly,
the gendered structure of marriage differentially encouraged con-
formity to commitment expectations. Because the wife's gendered
marital tasks created human capital that was marriage-specific,
marital stability was more tangibly critical to her welfare. The
stakes were higher for her because the costs of marital dissolution
were higher. Finally, the behavioral objectives of commitment
norms-to discourage selfish behavior and encourage each spouse
to identify his or her self-interest with that of the other-are fully
compatible with wives' gendered obligations, but in tension with
the autonomy-enhancing roles of husbands.33 Thus, behavioral ex-
pectations for husbands and wives may differ in subtle ways, and
wives may submit to these norms more faithfully, a response that
may exacerbate inequality.
B. The Enforcement Structure of Marital Norms
The complexity of the normative framework regulating marriage
is mirrored in the equally complex enforcement structure. The
elaborate ceremony and distinctive customs surrounding marriage
set the stage for enforcement of marital obligations. These tradi-
tions serve several functions. First, the ceremonial change of status
memorializes the couple's explicit (and implicit) agreement to be
subject to marital norms, and thus reinforces both the bonding and
monitoring functions of the normative structure. Further, the cou-
ple's exchange of promises directly to one another and before their
32At common law, adultery was an offense only if the woman was married. Adultery
by a married woman interfered with her husband's property interest in her, including
his interest in her sexual services. See Melissa Ash Haggard, Note, Adultery: A
Comparison of Military Law and State Law and the Controversy this Causes Under
our Constitution and Criminal Justice System, 37 Brandeis L.J. 469, 470-71 (1998);
see also Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38
Hastings L.J. 195, 201-21 (1986) (chronicling the historical development of adultery
laws and demonstrating how they favored men).
33The symbolic importance of the traditional custom of wives assuming husbands'
surnames and of the wearing of engagement and wedding rings by wives, but not
husbands, captures the "contamination" of commitment norms by gender norms. The
modem tradition of exchange of wedding rings suggests evolution toward marriage as
an egalitarian relationship binding both parties. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and
Promises, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 203, 212-13 (1990) (addressing the symbolic
importance of the engagement ring).
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community underscores the multilayered structure of enforcement.
The parties understand that marital norms will be enforced on four
levels: through individual precommitment to abide by the obligations,
through both spousal and community sanctions, and ultimately (if in-
formal mechanisms fail) through legal enforcement. The role of
spousal enforcement underscores the complexity of marital norms
and of the enforcement structure. In a real sense, the married cou-
ple constitutes a distinct norm community, functioning within the
larger community.
1. The Customs and Traditions of Marriage
By exchanging wedding rings and ceremonial promises, the cou-
ple bind themselves to one another in a way that signals both the
seriousness of their intentions to undertake the many obligations of
marriage and their nonavailability for other intimate relations.'
Through the solemn public expression of enduring commitment,
each spouse signals that he or she is what Eric Posner has called a
"good type," a reliable person who can be counted on for the long
haul.35 This public announcement expresses a mutual willingness to
be held accountable for faithful performance and to be subject to
sanctions should they later defect.
Wedding traditions underscore the idea that spousal accountability
extends to the community as well as to the partner. Engagement
bands, engagement and wedding announcements, and the partici-
pation of family and friends in the wedding ceremony all suggest
the importance of community witness to the mutual expression of
commitment. Weddings are important celebrations in which the
couple symbolically invites the community to monitor their future
The wedding ring serves both bonding and monitoring functions. It functions as a
precommitment (and thus as a bonding arrangement) because it is likely to reduce the
incidence of future temptation (and thus defection), by signaling to outsiders that the
spouse is unavailable for an intimate relationship. It also promotes monitoring, by
inviting third parties to evaluate the spouses' behavior against the expectations of
married persons. These functions underscore the importance of the traditional
convention of wives, but not husbands, wearing wedding rings.
See Posner, supra note 9, at 260. As Posner and others have pointed out, marriage
serves a signaling function, which allows individuals with low discount rates (and thus
serious intentions for a long-term relationship) to identify one another. It thus
facilitates efficient matching. See Bishop, supra note 9, at 250; Posner, supra note 9, at
260-262; Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 250.
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marital behavior.' The ceremonial rite of passage underscores the
fact that both the spouse and the community now have expecta-
tions of, and an enforceable stake in, future marital behavior.
2. Self-Enforcement
The vows undertaken by each spouse in the marriage ceremony
are the basis for self-enforcement of marital norms. Long before
marriage, however, most individuals are familiar with the traditions
and ceremony, and are socialized to understand the importance of
the behavioral expectations for the role of husband or wife. Thus,
for many people, the social meaning of marriage and the associated
behavioral expectations have become internalized by the time they
consider marriage themselves." The ceremony itself may reinforce
that internalization process, so that the individual enters marriage
resolved to fulfill the obligations of the spousal role-a resolution
that is intensified and supported by a strong emotional bond to the
spouse. Thereafter, engaging in behavior that is harmful to the
other's interests is likely to result in feelings of guilt, a sanction that
operates even if the misbehavior goes undetected by others.
Self-enforcement thus plays a particularly important role in mar-
riage. Given the broad scope of the relationship and the complexity
of marital obligations, it is difficult for others (including the
spouse) to detect norm violations. The privacy and intimacy of the
relationship limits monitoring by outsiders, and excessive monitor-
ing between the spouses threatens to undermine the relationship."8
Thus, self-enforcement of marital norms through guilt is essential
to maintaining a cooperative equilibrium.
3 All norm enforcement by third parties involves monitoring and the imposition of
sanctions for violations. To describe community enforcement of marital norms as
employing monitoring arrangements as that term is understood in agency theory is
particularly apt, because of the voluntary contractual nature of the change of status
that subjects the couple to the norms. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 308.
Although girls may be socialized to understand the expectations in marriage to a
greater extent than boys, the ceremonial bachelor party shortly before the wedding
suggests that the meaning of the impending change of status is salient for men as well
as for women.
-s The norm of trust complements norms that restrict marital behavior so as to
inspire trust. It seems fair to say that excessive monitoring of a spouse's behavior
signals trouble in the marriage.
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3. Relational Norms-Enforcement Within Marriage
Marriage itself-the relationship between the spouses-is a dis-
tinct norm community, a fact that complicates the system of norm
definition and enforcement in this context.39 The married couple
lives intimately together in an exclusive relationship, interacting
frequently over a long period of time. Thus, their relationship with
each other is different both in quality and in scope from their rela-
tionship with the larger community.
Each married couple develops a complex set of expectations and
patterns of behavior that evolve over time. Through these "rela-
tional norms," the couple pursues the goal of a stable cooperative
relationship by devising behavioral rules that reflect their individ-
ual values and preferences (and each party's relative power in the
relationship). Thus, a couple may have specific expectations about
the performance of household duties, behavior in social settings,
reconciliation after arguments, how leisure time is spent, and many
other matters. Some relational norms are enforced only by the
spouses themselves.' Indeed, outsiders may not be aware of many
of the rules and understandings that are important in promoting
cooperation in a marriage. Thus, for example, a couple may have a
private understanding that the more outgoing spouse should not
abandon the timid spouse at big social gatherings. Other relational
norms, such as the norm of sexual fidelity, create expectations
about appropriate marital behavior that are broadly applicable and
are enforced by the community as well as by the spouses. Both
variations are derived from the commitment and gender norms de-
scribed earlier."
39A similar complexity may exist in the employment context, where a given
workplace may constitute a norm community, within the larger community governed
by general workplace norms. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913,
1920-22 (1996). As in marriage, workplace norms may be customized in particular
workplaces. See infra note 55.
40 This underscores the fact the marriage itself is a norm community (with only the
spouses as members) within the larger community.
41In earlier work, Robert Scott and I treated the first type of relational norms as a
category distinct from broader social norms, which we called societal norms. See Scott
& Scott, supra note 4, at 1256-57 & n.79. I am now inclined to think that these norms
are simply customized rules derived from the broader social norms regulating
marriage, and that what is distinctive about them is that they are only enforced by the
spouses and not by the broader community. For example, the community expects
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The enforcement of relational norms by spouses is a complex,
dynamic process of continuous interaction. I have previously ana-
lyzed marriage as a two-person strategic interaction game of
indefinite duration.42 Game theory predicts that the couple may be
able to maintain a stable equilibrium by using a tit-for-tat strategy,
one in which each spouse returns cooperation with cooperation,
punishes norm violations when they occur, and then returns to co-
operation in subsequent interactions. 3 However, the emotional
bond of marriage and the intensity of interaction distinguish it
from other relationships in ways that may increase the variance be-
tween cooperation and defection. On the one hand, for each
spouse, the other's esteem is uniquely important, and the withhold-
ing of esteem through anger or withdrawal is a particularly
effective sanction.' Moreover, the foundation of affection and
loyalty between spouses. What loyalty requires in a given marriage (for example,
"Don't leave me at the party") may vary among married couples. Couples may also
customize to a certain extent marital norms that are enforced by the community. For
example, the general norm of sexual fidelity is enforced by third parties,. In a given
marriage, the couple's understanding may be that flirting with others is permitted
behavior or that it constitutes a serious violation. With powerful norms such as sexual
fidelity, the variations are likely to hover around a mean. A good example of the
general conservatism is the response to "open marriage," a model of marriage
advocated enthusiastically in the 1970s, in which the norm of sexual fidelity was
greatly relaxed. See Nena O'Neill & George O'Neill, Open Marriage: A New Life
Style for Couples (1972). The skeptical reaction to and the short-lived interest in this
book, as well as the divorce of the authors, suggest that important marital norms
cannot be dramatically customized.
Couples sometimes devise customized rules for marriage that are contrary to
societal expectations under commitment or gender norms. Thus, a couple may agree
that the wife will be the wage eamer and the husband the homemaker. Within the
norm community of a particular marriage, this role allocation may be deemed
optimal, despite disapproval of the broader community. Deviations from dominant
norms occur in many norm contexts, when small groups (utopian communities and
delinquent gangs, for example) adopt norms that are inconsistent with those of the
broader society.
42 See Scott, supra note 15.
See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 30-33 (1984) (describing
patterns of cooperation in an iterated game); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra
note 3, at 2009-30 (developing a game-theoretic model to distribute risk in long-term
contractual relationships).
I am persuaded by Richard McAdams's argument that people comply with norms
in part because they care about the esteem of others. See McAdams, supra note 13, at
355-57. This approach is not incompatible with Eric Posner's signaling analysis. See
Posner, supra note 9, at 259-62. A husband may give his wife an expensive gift out of
straightforward devotion or to signal that he is a good husband. Assuming the latter
motivation dominates, desire to retain or enhance esteem may be an incentive.
Legal Regulation of Marriage
commitment inclines both spouses toward cooperation initially,
and facilitates a return to cooperation after a norm violation has
been punished. On the other hand, the intensity of the emotional
bond can make even trivial violations particularly hurtful (think of
the forgotten birthday), sometimes leading to excessive retaliation
that can trigger a destabilizing spiral of mutual recriminations. In
this context, the background norm of enduring loyalty and the ex-
pectation of a lifelong relationship play a particularly important
role, facilitating escape from a pattern of destructive interactions
and a return to a cooperative equilibrium.
4. Community Enforcement
Although the effectiveness of norm enforcement rests heavily on
the extent of internalization by the spouses and the couple's ability
to maintain a cooperative equilibrium through mutual enforcement, it
depends also on whether the couple anticipates reputational harm or
other social sanctions for defection.45 Because marital privacy is
45 Community norm sanctions can include gossip, criticism, social ostracism, and
financial penalties, such as a refusal to do business with a norm violator. See Robert
C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 207-13 (1991).
Violation of marital norms can damage professional advancement, although less
today than in an earlier era. Consider the derailing of the appointment of Army
General Joseph Ralston to the position of Joint Chief of Staff when it was revealed
that he engaged in extramarital affairs. See Joint Chiefs Nomination Less Certain,
USA Today, June 6, 1997, at IA. General Ralston removed himself from
consideration for the position, but was later appointed Supreme Allied Commander
of the -NATO forces despite protests from many. See Richard J. Newman, The New
NATO Chief, U.S. News & World Rep., May 15,2000, at 12. Mike DuBose, the head
football coach for Alabama, suffered from negative publicity and the possibility of
losing his coaching job after it was revealed that he had an extramarital affair and lied
about it. The Alabama Board of Trustees later decided to reduce his salary by
$360,000 as punishment. See Brian P. Dunleavy, Game Misconducts, The Village
Voice, Dec. 28,1999, at 190.
Violation of marital norms can be punished severely in the political arena.
Consider, for example, Nelson Rockefeller, who was humiliated at the Republican
Convention in 1964 because he was divorced. He was harassed during his campaign
because of his divorce and subsequent remarriage to a woman who gave up custody of
her four children from a previous marriage. See, e.g., Linda Chavez, The Bad Choices
Made in the 1970s, The Indianapolis Star, Feb. 29, 2000, at A8. Remember also
Hillary Rodham Clinton, whose suggestion in her husband's 1992 campaign that her
role was not to stay home and bake cookies generated intense criticism. See, e.g.,
Steve Rubenstein, Having Cookies, Tea Can be a Hard Lot, S.F. Chron., March 27,
1992, at D24.
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highly valued in our society, the community enforcement role is
somewhat limited. Nonetheless, marital commitment and gender
norms traditionally were the subject of broad societal consensus,
and couples could expect community monitoring of their perform-
ance and censure for violations.
Even when such a consensus exists, however, the effectiveness of
community regulation will vary depending on how strongly marital
norms are endorsed in the couple's immediate social context. A
couple's community could include extended family, neighbors, so-
cial group, or religious community, and several communities may
overlap in enforcing marital norms.46 In a small, highly integrated
community that strongly endorses marital norms, the societal con-
sensus will be amplified, and community norm enforcement
predictably will be highly effective.47 Small communities are effec-
tive norm enforcers for several reasons. Monitoring is facilitated
because community members all know one another and interact on
an ongoing basis. This is important in several ways. Community
members themselves are motivated to enforce norms to gain repu-
tational benefits as supporters of approved norms.4" Indeed, norms
theorists have argued that community members respond to secon-
dary enforcement norms, under which the failure to show
disapproval of norm violators may itself lead to sanctions.49 More-
over, sanctions are particularly effective because in a small
community, the potential norm violator is likely to value highly the
esteem of community members.' In contrast, if the couple's com-
One key factor in norm enforcement is the couple's degree of integration in the
community. Another might be the extent to which the various communities are
consistent in their values that implicate marital norms.
41 See Ellickson, supra note 45, at 177-82.
43 Norm scholars have suggested that a secondary norm develops to encourage norm
enforcement, because community members do not want to be sanctioned as tolerant
of defectors from important norms. McAdams argues that norm enforcement works
because all that is required is the withholding of esteem from the violator, an act that
is relatively costless. See McAdams, supra note 13, at 357, 372-75; see also Cooter,
supra note 13, at 1645-46 (arguing that the enforcement of custom in advanced
economies is essential to true efficiency).
49 See McAdams, supra note 13, at 372-73 (explaining why community members
enforce norms).
'0 Richard McAdams makes this point in explaining why individuals-for example,
gang members-conform to the norms of a social subgroup that are inconsistent with
the norms endorsed by society. Gang members care more about their reputation
within the gang than about societal approval. See id. at 386-90.
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munity only weakly endorses marital norms, if their various com-
munities express different attitudes (sending inconsistent signals) 1
or if the couple's social affiliations are tenuous, then social expecta-
tions will play a much weaker role in enforcing marital obligations.2
Each spouse's intentions to perform faithfully may be undermined if
they observe others in their social world violating marital norms
without cost. The couple comes to expect of each other and of
themselves what their social community seems to expect of married
couples.53
II. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL REGULATION ON
NORMATIVE MARRIAGE
A. Legal Influence on Family Norms
Specifying the impact of the legal regime on the norms sur-
rounding marriage is a speculative undertaking, complicated by the
fact that family relationships are generally understood to be out-
side the domain of direct legal regulation. Direct legal coercion is
not commonly employed to enforce family obligations in intact
marriages, even on matters that are subject to legal regulation.'
For the most part, legal enforcement occurs only when family rela-
tions break down, either due to divorce or to major defections
from acceptable behavior (like assault or abuse). At first glance,
therefore, it would seem that in regulating family relationships, law
and social norms operate largely in two separate and distinct
spheres.'
51 For example, the couple's family may strongly endorse marital norms, while their
social group is indifferent.
R Even in an era when marital norms generally were strongly enforced, the level of
enforcement varied in different contexts (as it does today). Thus, community
enforcement predictably would play a more modest role in the behavior of city
dwellers, Hollywood celebrities, and people who move frequently, or have no family
and few friends. It might be a more powerful force in a small town or a conservative
religious community.
See Hardin, supra note 5, at 36-37.
5 Thus, absent dire circumstances, the husband's traditional legal duty to support
his wife was not enforced during marriage. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d
336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to sanction a husband for failure to provide his wife
with basic amenities, despite having the financial means to do so).
This is the pattern that Lisa Bernstein observes (and argues for) among diamond
merchants and others, where parties typically agree not to subject disputes to
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In reality, the law functions in two ways to influence the social
norms surrounding marriage. First, the legal enforcement of family
obligations constitutes the outer layer of the enforcement structure
described above. The law sanctions serious norm violations when
informal enforcement is inadequate, and through feedback mecha-
nisms, deters defection and strengthens norms. Second, the law
plays a role in defining marital norms and in influencing their evo-
lution. Claims about the extent to which the law has influenced
norms in this setting, or even the direction of the influence, must
be tentative. Nonetheless, it seems clear that a dialectical pattern
characterizes the interaction between social norms and the law and
that they regulate marital behavior in tandem.
1. The Role of Law in the Enforcement of Norms
The role of law in enforcing family obligation is generally in-
voked when family relationships have broken down. It is well
understood that legal enforcement is particularly important upon
termination of long-term relationships, when the parties' interests
are no longer aligned, and the effectiveness of informal mecha-
nisms for enforcing obligations declines or disappears. 6 The
availability of legal enforcement also has an ex ante effect, which is
the key to its role in reinforcing norms. It operates as a feedback
mechanism, discouraging defection and encouraging behavior ac-
cording to normative prescriptions. For example, the parent who is
inclined to violate a norm of parental obligation by inflicting severe
physical punishment on her child (and for whom the temptation
would override concern about informal enforcement by spouse and
neighbors) may be deterred by the anticipation of legal interven-
tion or the loss of custody of the child. In this sense, legal
litigation. See Bernstein, supra note 16, at 115. In their analysis of the employment
relationship, Edward Rock and Michael Wachter argue that parties should be allowed
to choose between law (contractual obligation) and norms, and that courts should not
enforce the norm against discharge without cause. See Rock & Wachter, supra note
39, at 1938-52.
- See Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 3, at 2034-44; Scott & Scott,
supra note 4, at 1295-300. In general, this is why the state enforces many marital
obligations on divorce (such as spousal and child support) that are enforced through
informal means during marriage.
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enforcement represents a final (and powerful) layer of enforce-
ment in a multilayered system.'
Changes in the level of legal sanctions can strengthen a weak
norm, and even influence norm change. Imposing stronger or dif-
ferent legal sanctions reinforces informal enforcement mechanisms
and may clarify an emerging norm consensus where behavioral ex-
pectations may have previously been uncertain. A good .example of
the dynamics of this process is the recent trend toward criminal
prosecution in domestic violence cases. Acts of domestic violence
have been the subject of increasing social censure, as advocacy
groups, acting as "norm entrepreneurs," have publicized informa-
tion about the harms to women. " But community enforcement
alone has not been particularly effective, owing to the power im-
balance between offender and victim and the secrecy of the
behavior. Although domestic assaults were legally prohibited, en-
forcement was historically lax. As the social norm became stronger,
political pressure for more effective legal enforcement increased.
Research evidence suggests that, although the effectiveness of legal
reforms that promote criminal arrest and prosecution of domestic
abusers has been mixed, the response has been positive among poten-
tial offenders with community ties-a group for whom anticipated
reputational harms may carry substantial weight.59
7Other examples are legal enforcement of the child support obligation and of
spousal commitment norms, as I will discuss in Part IV.
53 Lawsuits against police departments, protests, and other publicity by advocates
lead to changes in how police deal with domestic violence, and general changes in
attitudes about husbands' rights to physically assault their wives. See, e.g., Thurman v.
City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (refusing to dismiss Thurman's
suit against the Torrington Police department for failing to protect her from her
abusive husband); Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 163,
170-71 (3d ed. 1998). These advocates were norm entrepreneurs, leaders who aimed
to influence and shape norms by criticizing existing norms and behavior. See
McAdams, supra note 13, at 394-95; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 909-10, 929.
59 See Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest on Aggression
Against Intimates, Criminology (forthcoming 2000); Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing
Domestic Violence: Experiments & Dilemmas (1992). Studies of initiatives by
communities to respond to domestic violence incidents with criminal arrest indicate
that men who have ties to the community (through employment, long residence, etc.)
are deterred by community enforcement. This is not surprising, since these men are
likely to value community esteem and to anticipate high reputational costs from
further incidents. Further, the anticipated loss of employment is likely to serve as an
effective deterrent.
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Sometimes legal sanctions function not only to strengthen social
norms but also to stimulate informal enforcement. Consider, for
example, a policy enacted by the Virginia Child Support Enforce-
ment Agency. The agency recently began disabling the vehicles of
parents who are delinquent in their child support payments by in-
stalling well-marked pink and blue boots. The boots serve as a
conventional legal enforcement tool-the vehicle cannot be re-
claimed until the payments are made. They also presumably serve
to shame the defector among friends, neighbors and colleagues,
thus encouraging informal community enforcement. This policy
will predictably promote compliance, not only because the obligor
parent anticipates the loss of his car, but also because he wants to
avoid community disapproval.'
2. The Role of Law in Defining and Influencing Norms
Beyond its enforcement role, legal regulation can play a role in
shaping normative behavior in marriage in at least three ways."
First, legal rules can clarify and announce the specific behavioral
expectations embodied in social norms. The state can also influ-
ence norm change through deregulation, by withdrawing legal rules
that define family obligation and thereby weakening the norms
that are reinforced by those rules. Finally, the state, through the
law's expressive function, subtly shapes the definition of marital
roles and norms even while leaving enforcement to the existing
normative structure.
Legal regulation functions to particularize the broader behav-
ioral standards embodied in social norms.' Bright-line legal rules
clarify precisely what behavior is required of spouses and parents
See generally Boot It!, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 7,2000, at A12 (discussing
Virginia's plan to enforce child support by "booting" the cars of parents who have not
paid child support); Ledyard King, Deadbeat Parents' Cars Get the Boot From State:
Officials Count On The "Shame Factor," Virginian-Pilot, Jan. 3,2000, at Al (same).
61 It is apparent that no clear line distinguishes the state's role in reinforcing marital
norms through legal enforcement and its role in influencing the direction of norm
change. As the example of domestic violence prosecution suggests, legal enforcement
may facilitate the emergence of a norm that otherwise might evolve differently.
This insight was first noted by Richard McAdams. See McAdams, supra note 13,
at 402.
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under the relevant norm.63 For example, parents are subject to an
abstract commitment norm encouraging them to educate their
children and prepare them to be productive citizens. In the early
twentieth century, compulsory school attendance statutes defined
one requirement for complying with the norm. Before these laws
were enacted, parents interpreted the norm according to their own
values and exigencies. The attendance law signaled parents that
compliance with the norm required a concrete minimum amount of
schooling (until age sixteen, usually), and that withdrawing a child
from school at a younger age violated the norm. These laws af-
fected behavior directly by sanctioning parents who violated them.
Eventually, parents internalized the legal requirement as establish-
ing a baseline of what good parenting required. At that point, most
parents would have felt guilty if they violated the norm and would
disapprove of parents who cheated on this obligation.'4 Recently,
some states have concluded that this norm is weakening and have
sought to strengthen it by enacting truancy statutes that impose li-
ability on parents as well as children for violations.65
Bright-line legal rules that particularize an abstract norm serve
principally to clarify and amplify the normative prescription.
Whether the legal mandate influences the normative landscape will
depend in part on whether the new rule is broadly consistent with
community expectations about the kind of behavioral obligations
required under the norm.' Often a legal rule will announce a norm
consensus. Those who previously may have been uncertain about the
strength of the norm may be motivated to comply, to avoid informal
sanctions as well as a legal penalty.67 If the legal requirement departs
63 See id. at 407-08. McAdams uses the example of laws requiring the use of child
safety restraints in cars.
64Casual empiricism suggests that school attendance laws expanded parents' sense
of obligation to educate their children. The legal requirement established the
minimum obligation, and the norm became completion of high school.
61 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 232.09, 232.19 (West Supp. 2000); Iowa Code Ann.
§§ 299.1-299.6 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
6 As I indicate below, preference disguise makes the assessment of community
opinion difficult and the prediction about the impact of legal reform uncertain. See
infra notes 179-189 and accompanying text.
67 See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 Va. L. Rev. 1603, 1603-08 (2000). For example, a law requiring child restraints in
cars may reveal to a parent that concern about her child's safety requires that she
have a safety seat. She may be motivated to comply, even if the law is minimally
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substantially from the expectations created by the norm standard,
however, resistance is predictable and legal enforcement is likely to
be costly.' Thus, a compulsory attendance statute that required
school attendance until age 21 likely would be ineffective in influ-
encing parental commitment norms.
The state might also affect norm change when a bright-line rule
that previously reinforced an existing normative standard is abolished.
If the abandoned legal rule expressed a concrete prescription for be-
havior under the norm, deregulation may create uncertainty about
what constitutes acceptable conduct under the standard. Deregula-
tion may be seen as signaling the community that the old norm is
obsolete, or at least not worthy of legal legitimacy.69 Thus, for ex-
ample, the replacement of the tender years presumption favoring
maternal custody with the best interest standard as the decision
rule for resolving child custody disputes may be understood as sig-
naling legal rejection of differentiated parenting roles.
Some norms scholars have argued that law influences norms
through its expressive function." Although claims about this role of
enforced, because, as one who wants to be viewed as a good mother, she fears
reputational harm among neighbors and friends.
6 Paul Robinson and John Darley argue that to be effective, criminal law should
track social norms. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and
Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law 4-7 (1995); see also Tom R. Tyler,
Why People Obey the Law 22-27 (1990) (noting that compliance depends on
legitimacy and public acceptance).
6 This in turn may encourage norm violation by those who privately disliked the old
norm, but feared social sanction. Increased deviation and uncertainty about the
viability of the norm may increase third party enforcement costs, thus discouraging
enforcement. See infra Section IV.B.2.
70 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725, 754-55, 761-63 (1998); Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 953-65. An interesting debate has emerged in the legal literature over
the viability of expressive theories of law. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories
of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev 1363 (2000); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121 (1990). I do not mean to
engage the claims for or against the robustness of such theories. I join a number of
norms scholars in assuming that the law influences and reinforces social norms at
some level through its expressive function, although measuring the influence may not
be possible. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2000). Robert Cooter equates the creation of norms by courts with
the expression of social values. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics,
27 J. Legal Stud. 585, 585-86 (1998). For my purposes, the law's influence on social
norms through its expressive function simply describes the impact on norms
(including norm enforcement) other than that created directly by legal sanction. Some
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law are speculative, it seems plausible that law influences marital
attitudes and behavior beyond or apart from its legal enforcement
function. Indeed, the expressive function of the law seems particu-
larly salient in the family law context because legal prescriptions
often are not formally enforced.7 The role of legal regulation in the
evolution of gender norms provides a good example. The tradi-
tional endorsement of sharply differentiated gender norms in
marriage under traditional family law only occasionally involved
legal enforcement. Much of the law's importance was expressive: It
gave family governance authority to husbands and implicitly as-
signed family roles, while discouraging women from functioning in
the public sphere. The necessaries doctrine, the tender years pre-
sumption,73 the husband's duty of support and authority to decide
marital domicile, and the denial to women of access to professions
and of the right to vote expressed and supported hierarchical gen-
der roles and traditional marital norms with little legal intervention
in the "private" realm of the family. ' Today, the state's attitude
toward marital roles and norms is strongly egalitarian, but again its
importance is largely expressive and facilitative, shaping attitudes
rather than directly motivating spousal behavior.
norms scholars adopt a much narrower definition, excluding any effect on sanctions.
See McAdams, supra, at 1652,1676-78,1709-10.
7 Some scholars seek to demonstrate that law can influence norms without
influencing even informal sanctions. See McAdams, supra note 70, at 1652, 1676-78,
1709-10.
72 This doctrine allowed merchants to sue husbands for the costs of necessaries
provided to his wife, creating an indirect remedy for a wife whose husband failed to
provide support. See Ellman et al., supra note 58, at 138.
73 The tender years presumption assumes that it is in the interest of young children
to continue in the care of their mother, who was thus usually awarded custody, unless
unfit. See id. at 614-16.
74 Consider also the 1872 opinion of Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872), in
which the Supreme Court expressed strong support for differentiated gender roles in
upholding an Illinois law prohibiting women from being licensed to practice law. In
his concurrence, Justice Bradley opined that there is "a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life." Id. at
141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Frances Olsen argues that the view of family and the
market as separate spheres has hampered efforts at reforms to equalize women's
place in society. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497,1560-78 (1983).
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The mechanisms by which law through its expressive function in-
fluences social norms are unclear, and the extent of influence
impossible to measure. Moreover, causation issues are compli-
cated, as norms and law interact through complex feedback
mechanisms. Sometimes the law simply communicates a settled
normative consensus, and independent legal influence is hard to
detect. But, as Richard McAdams argues, a legal enactment can
also publicize a new consensus about desirable behavior,75 or even,
I would suggest, push public opinion toward that new consensus.
The legal reforms directed toward promoting gender equality
would seem to belong in the last category.
B. The Legal Framework of Traditional Marriage:
A Case Study of Norm Management
Traditional legal policy regulating marriage reflected unbounded
enthusiasm for the role of the state as active norm manager. Al-
though religion and morality played an important part in shaping
commitment and gender norms, a rigid legal framework coercively
structured the marital relationship and powerfully amplified infor-
mal enforcement mechanisms with legal compulsion. Thus, until
relatively recently, family law and marital norms formed an inter-
nally coherent and mutually reinforcing system for defining and
enforcing parental and spousal obligations. The traditional frame-
work thus provides an excellent case study of the complex
interactions between law and norms.
Parental commitment norms found concrete expression in pre-
emptive rules such as vaccination requirements, school attendance
laws, and the prohibition of child labor. In general, however, legal
intervention in intact families was reserved for gross violations un-
der child abuse regulation, or for situations in which a child's
behavior revealed that parental discipline was inadequate. Gen-
dered parental obligations were enforced primarily in divorce
regulation. The tender years presumption awarded custody to
mothers who adequately fulfilled their primary caretaking role. A
legal presumption was warranted because most mothers complied.
Divorced fathers were obliged to support the children of the mar-
75 See McAdams, supra note 13, at 402. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how this may influence behavior.
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riage financially. Care and support of illegitimate children rested in
the mother. Fathers had no legal obligation to these children, sig-
naling the stigma attached both to illegitimacy and to the status of
motherhood outside of marriage.76
Spousal commitment norms, in turn, were amplified indirectly
by symbolic legal expression and directly by legal sanctions. Crimi-
nal prohibition of adultery, although seldom enforced, endorsed
the norm of sexual fidelity in marriage, as did the tort sanctioning
third party interference with marital relations.' Fault grounds for
divorce-adultery, desertion, and physical cruelty-censured viola-
tors of marital commitment norms. Through these prohibitions, the
law reinforced the core obligations of marriage, signaling to the
community that violations were so reprehensible that the injured
spouse was relieved of his or her duty to perform marital obliga-
tions. The legal enforcement of marital obligations upon divorce
also strengthened commitment norms directly, by adding a serious
sanction for violation. Divorce, with its often humiliating public
reckoning, substantial financial costs, and formal change in status,
became a threshold that many spouses would hesitate to cross.
Beyond the content of fault grounds for divorce, the fact that di-
vorce law created a substantial barrier to exit underscored that
marriage was a lifelong commitment, reinforcing the norm of mari-
tal loyalty. This barrier also generated feedback effects, which
reinforced cooperative patterns of behavior that emerged as rela-
7 Fathers bore no responsibility and were not subject to social sanction for failure to
support, nurture, or even recognize their children born 6utside of marriage-although
they might experience some social disapproval for producing such children. See
Shanley, supra note 23, at 67-69. This difference signaled the shameful status of
illegitimacy and the privileged status of marriage as the only socially acceptable
context for producing children. It also suggests that men and women who violated the
norms against producing illegitimate children were sanctioned quite differently. See
supra note 23.
nSee generally Richard Wightman Fox, Trials of Intimacy: Love and Loss in the
Beecher-Tilton Scandal (1999) (describing the scandal surrounding the alienation of
affections suit brought by Theodore Tilton against the prominent preacher Henry
Ward Beecher in the late nineteenth century, in which Tilton alleged that Beecher
seduced his wife Elizabeth, a parishioner; after a highly publicized five-month trial,
the jury concluded by a 9-3 vote that Tilton had failed to provide sufficient evidence
of the tort); see also Ellman et al., supra note 58, at 184 (discussing liability for
interference with marital relations and its professed purposes).
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tional norms.78 Opportunistic behavior was deterred because each
spouse realized that exit was not an easily available option, and
that retaliation from the spouse could be expected for defection.
The state's endorsement of marriage as a formally licensed,
privileged status reinforced the social norms regulating marriage in
ways that may well be unique to this complex legal institution."
The legal privileges associated with marriage, together with the
harsh sanctions imposed on other intimate relationships,' an-
nounced that marriage was a highly esteemed status. For example,
married couples enjoyed inheritance rights, unique rights of co-
ownership, tax benefits, a testimonial privilege protecting commu-
nications, and legitimacy status for their children.' Because
marriage offered substantial tangible and intangible legal benefits,
the anticipated loss of these benefits on divorce was significant.
Thus, traditional law created a powerful combination of carrots
and sticks such that fulfillment of marital obligations promised re-
wards and defection resulted in serious sanctions.
78 Game theory suggests that in a long-term relationship, the anticipation of
indefinite future interactions deters opportunistic behavior. See supra note 43. In
marriage, this notion might be expressed as follows: "We're in this relationship for the
duration, and we may as well make the best of it." See Scott, supra note 15, at 42-44.
7 Traditional marriage was a privileged status, which carried, as Eric Posner puts it,
a "basket of immutable obligations." Posner, supra note 9, at 270.
1 Cohabitation was a "meretricious" relationship, warranting no legal recognition
or protection. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112-13 (Cal. 1976) (detailing the legal
history of cohabitation); see also Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-11 (I11.
1979) (capturing the view that cohabitation did not warrant legal protection); Glasgo
v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. App. 1980) (reserving the right to define
certain relationships as illicit and against public policy).
81 The testimonial privilege underscored the norm of open communication and
truth-telling in marriage. This privilege was legally invoked on occasion, but it also
stood as a symbolic recognition of the special status of marital communications. See
Ellman et al., supra note 58, at 180-83; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the
Meanings of Marriage, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2045, 2092, 2106-07, 2113-25, 2156 (1995). Tax
benefits are available to married couples, although two-career couples with roughly
comparable income are often penalized by owing a higher tax rate for their joint
income than each would pay individually. This "marriage penalty" suggests
endorsement of traditional marriage with differentiated roles. See Ellman et al., supra
note 58, at 84. Some privileges continue to be available exclusively to married
couples. Only married couples can own property as tenants by the entirety. See Jesse
Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 323 (4th ed. 1998). Spouses also have
inheritance rights that cannot be set aside by will. See Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M.
Johanson, Wills, Trusts & Estates 472,480 (6th ed. 2000).
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More generally, the sharp legal boundaries of traditional mar-
riage-its well-understood obligations, privileges, and restrictions
on entry and exit-reinforced its clear social meaning.' This signal-
ing function served several purposes, which, in combination,
tended to stabilize marriage and to reinforce commitment norms.
First, it facilitated a matching process, allowing those with similar
intentions to accurately identify themselves and each other as good
prospects for successful marriage. Marital status was also a clear
signal to the community that the parties were unavailable for other
intimate relationships, and thus should not be pursued.' This status
also indicated the parties' stability, reliability, and adherence to
conventional values. Indirectly, this reputational benefit tended to
encourage married persons to conform to the behavioral expecta-
tions associated with the role, at least in public, so as to reap the
benefits of a respected status. Finally, because the package of le-
gally mandated behavioral restrictions was well understood, the
clear social meaning of marriage facilitated community enforce-
ment.8
A caveat is in order here. The powerful legal privileging of tradi-
tional marriage, together with the stigma attached to other
intimate relationships, undoubtedly constrained choices and led
some individuals to marry whose private preferences might have
been for another arrangement. This coercive influence likely un-
dermined the effectiveness of the matching function and distorted
the accuracy of marriage as a signal. Some reluctant individuals
may have been more likely to violate marital norms-although as
married persons, they would be subject to the powerful enforce-
ment mechanisms (except for guilt, perhaps) that encouraged
compliance.' For others, the normative and legal constraints defin-
ing the social meaning of marriage undermined their capacity to
12 The effectiveness of the marriage signal is dependent on the clarity of the social
meaning of marriage. See Bishop, supra note 9, at 253-54; Posner, supra note 9, at
270; Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 250-51.
13 See Bishop, supra note 9, at 250. Indeed, a secondary norm reinforces marital
fidelity by discouraging such behavior. Historically, this norm was embodied in the
criminal prohibition of adultery and in the tort of alienation of affections.
See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943,
956-61 (1995).
8 These would include, of course, the barriers to exit, which might give pause to the
seeker of a casual relationship.
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pursue self-defined life goals. Given the tendency to internalize po-
tent social values and norms, the extent of reluctant compliance
under the traditional regime is unclear. Nonetheless, these effects
must be counted as inefficiencies of the legal and normative
framework of traditional marriage.
The legal reinforcement of spousal commitment norms was ac-
companied by an equally powerful validation of hierarchical
gender roles and differentiated legal enforcement of commitment
obligations. Indeed, it is fair to say the social roles of women were
more flexible and less starkly hierarchical than the account ex-
pressed by legal regulation. Martha Minow has argued that
nineteenth-century women exercised authority within their families
and political influence in society, despite the fact that they were ef-
fectively denied legal personhood. 6 Legal reification of sharply
differentiated gender roles, which subordinated the interests of
women, persisted well past the mid-twentieth century. The marital
rape exemption in criminal law, the differential enforcement of the
criminal adultery prohibition, the division of property upon divorce
on the basis of title, the rules of marital domicile, and the tender
years presumption in custody law-all told a sharply gendered
story of marriageY
Traditional marriage law promoted the bundling of gender and
commitment norms. The costs of divorce regulation fell dispropor-
tionately on wives, who had far more to lose than did husbands if
the marriage failed. The wife against whom a fault ground was
proven was not entitled to alimony and was likely to lose custody
of her children as well.' For her, an extramarital affair carried a
16 See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a
History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819,826-27.
",See Liberta v. Kelly, 839 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing, but rejecting,
the common law marital rape exemption extended to a husband raping his wife), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); see also Saff v. Saff, 410 N.Y.S.2d 690, 694-95 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (stating there is no harm to the non-income producing spouse when
property is divided by title at divorce), appeal dismissed, 389 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1979).
The tender years presumption was the dominant custody rule until the 1970s. See
Ellman et al., supra note 58, at 615. It is seldom used today, but some commentators
view the primary caretaker preference in child custody as a gender-neutral application
of the tender years presumption. See id. at 663.
81 See generally Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28
Ariz. St. L.J. 773 (1996) (examining modern divorce law, the variable treatments of
fault, and the justifications for and complications with assigning fault).
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disproportionate risk of onerous legal and social penalties." She
could become impoverished and be publicly labeled a bad wife and
mother. There is little evidence that unfaithful husbands were the
objects of similarly harsh sanctions. Moreover, even if the wife was
the "innocent and injured" party, she was likely to receive minimal
spousal support. Thus, the legal regime reinforced the gendered
and disparate application of spousal commitment norms to hus-
bands and wives.'
By all appearances, traditional marriage was regulated by an ex-
traordinarily stable legal and normative structure, consisting of a
highly integrated set of norms embedded in a multilayered en-
forcement structure. Gender and commitment norms defining the
marital relationship were endorsed by spouses, and consistently re-
inforced by the larger community. These norms were highly
interconnected within a rigid legal framework that functioned to
define and enforce community expectations. The result was a regu-
latory scheme that was quite effective in encouraging spouses to
perform their obligations faithfully-although, as I have suggested,
the scheme was more effective with wives than with husbands.
III. A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN MARRIAGE
The subsequent history of the evolution of legal and normative
marriage has revealed that the apparent stability of traditional
marriage was illusory. Beginning in the 1960s, powerful social
forces challenged traditional spousal norms as inconsistent with
modem values, and lawmakers sought to respond by restructuring
the legal framework to reflect modem notions of bounded com-
mitment and gender equality. The overall impact has been a more
passive legal role in reinforcing marital commitment together with
systematic efforts to express an egalitarian vision of marriage.
Meanwhile, parental commitment norms and the supporting legal
framework have remained remarkably stable, despite changes in
family structure.
19 See supra note 32.
10 Custody and child support regulation expressed gendered accounts of parental
commitment obligations.
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A. Social Change and the Evolution of Marital Norms
The broad outlines of the story of sweeping changes in marriage
and family roles in the past generation are familiar. With the tech-
nological revolution, women, able to control fertility and less
burdened by domestic tasks, moved into the workplace in large
numbers. Sharply differentiated marital roles have become some-
what blurred, and at least a theoretical commitment to gender
equality has dominated political and social discourse (although in
practice, women have continued to bear primary domestic respon-
sibilities)." Marriage has become a more unstable relationship.
Although lasting 'marriage continues to be a cherished goal for
most people, many have become pessimistic about its achievement
in the face of increases in divorce rates.' Further, marriage no
longer retains its privileged status as the only acceptable intimate
relationship. For many couples, cohabitation precedes or substi-
tutes for marriage. Meanwhile, single parent households have
become common, mostly headed by unmarried or divorced
women.
In general, these social changes are reflected in the dilution of
the gender and commitment norms that defined spousal roles in
traditional marriage. In the 1960s and 1970s, feminists deployed the
egalitarian values manifested in the civil rights movement to chal-
lenge hierarchical marital roles as well as the associated
discrimination against women in the public sphere. Although fun-
damental gender role change remains an unrealized ideal, norms
censuring gender hierarchy have emerged in much of society and
the rhetoric of marriage as a partnership dominates public dis-
course.93 Marital commitment norms have changed as well. For
91 See Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift 188-203 (1989); Wax, supra note 28, at
514-15; see also Joseph H. Pleck, Working Wives/Working Husbands 15, 53-58
(1985); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 Cal.
L. Rev. 615, 660 n.145, 662 n.152 (1992).
9 SeeThe National Marriage Project, The State of Our Unions 1999: The Social
Health of Marriage in the United States 29 (Rutgers 1999) (noting that although teens
hope for a long-term marriage, they are pessimistic about having such a marriage).
For example, the husband who expresses his disapproval of his wife's working will
be subject to criticism in many circles. Even Dr. Laura Schlessinger, a conservative
advocate for traditional parental roles and opponent of day care, withheld unqualified
support for a husband who called in to her radio talk show to complain about his
wife's desire to return to work after the birth of their baby. Dr. Laura's response
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most people, the vow of commitment "until death do us part" is
conditional not only on the spouse's compliance with behavioral
norms, but also on an acceptable level of personal fulfillment. Be-
yond this qualification, the erosion of commitment norms may also
be due to their historic association with norms supporting gender
hierarchy. As spousal gender norms have become increasingly dis-
favored, commitment norms, intimately bundled with the
discredited norms, have also declined. Finally, the privileged status
of normative marriage has declined. A new liberal tolerance and
respect for autonomy are reflected in deference to individual self-
realization and acceptance of diverse choices in intimate relation-
ships.'
The picture is more complex than this account suggests, of
course, and I hasten to qualify it in several ways. First, the contem-
porary account of marriage and intimate relationships does not
enjoy the same public consensus that once characterized traditional
marriage. An outspoken religious and cultural subgroup actively
seeks public support for re-institution of traditional roles and
norms. More generally, norm change has not been as dramatic as it
would first appear. Although rigidly divided gender roles are less
typical today, parental obligations continue to be assigned on the
basis of gender. This allocation reinforces women's dependency
and, in subtle ways, perpetuates hierarchy in marriage.' Attitudes
about commitment are also complex. Lifelong marriage continues
to be an aspiration for many people, and divorce is often experi-
enced as a costly personal failure.' Further, bad behavior in
(clearly unexpected by the caller) was that he should quit work to care for the child.
See The Dr. Laura Show (Premiere Radio Networks radio broadcast, Aug. 16, 1999).
As Joan Williams argues, however, in general, women are constrained in their choices
about balancing work and family obligations. Many find themselves unable to fulfill
their parenting obligations satisfactorily while pursuing a demanding career and
"choose" to set aside or reduce their professional role, a choice that most men do not
consider. See Williams, supra note 29, at 6.
4 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803,1842-46 (1985).
95 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family 157-64
(1995); Williams, supra note 29, at 1-2. Steven Nock reports that most people view
the husband as the head of the household. See Nock, supra note 10, at 28-30. In his
view, the financial dependency of wives is the key ingredient of continued power
disparity in marriage. See id. at 132-33.
9 This suggests that many spouses continue to internalize commitment to lasting
marriage.
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marriage (particularly adultery) continues to generate criticism in
most social contexts, although it may no longer lead to social ostra-
cism. Indeed, some behavioral norms, such as the prohibition of
physical violence, are stronger today than previously. Moreover,
couples with successful and enduring marriages enjoy social ap-
proval, and those who experience repeated failure risk at least mild
gossip and censure.
Finally, parental commitment norms have not become weaker.
Parents today continue to be held responsible for the care and sup-
port of their children, and, indeed, there is some evidence that this
obligation may be expanding. Casual empiricism suggests that
modem parents feel obliged to be more involved in their children's
education and social lives than was true a generation ago, and are
more concerned about promoting their children's healthy psycho-
logical development.' Moreover, the public discourse surrounding
the recent increase in youth violence suggests that parents are held
morally responsible for the harms caused by their children." An-
other development that indicates that the scope of parental
responsibility may be expanding is the change in attitudes about
the parental duties of unmarried fathers. Formerly absolved of re-
sponsibility for (or even acknowledgment of) their children,
unmarried fathers today are assumed to be bound by their parental
role to provide support." In general, the obligation of parents to
97 Parental involvement in organized youth sports, homework, and the completion
of college applications has increased dramatically over the past few decades. More
parents now consult mental health professionals for their children's emotional
problems. See, e.g., Debra Nussbaum, How a Speeded Up Society Trickles Down to
Children: From Infancy to Academics, the Race is On, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1999, §
14, at 1; Linda Schlueter & Heather Creed, Parents Are No Longer Silent Partners in
Education: Educators and Parents Work Together for Excellence, Tex. Law., Aug. 7,
2000, at 27; Elizabeth Simpson, Children and Prescription Drugs: Medication Trend
Raises Concerns, Discipline Needed, Not Pills, Critics Say: Others Laud Help in
Behavior, Virginian-Pilot, Aug. 20,2000, at Al.
ISee, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Parents Blaming Parents, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1999
(Magazine), at 61; Jeff Kass, Columbine Shooters' Tapes Raise Questions on Parents'
Duties: Legal Standards, Experts' Advice Can Vary, Dallas Morning News, Dec. 22,
1999, at 8A.
99Much modern child support legislation is directed at unmarried fathers, a
dramatic change from the law's traditional stance. See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000) (making
it a federal crime for anyone, including unmarried fathers, to willfully refuse to pay
child support for a child in another state); Md. Code Ann., Fain. Law § 5-1028 (1999)
(requiring information be furnished to unmarried mothers informing them of their
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promote their children's welfare is at least as powerful today as it
was historically."
B. Legal Reform of the Marriage Relationship
In the relatively brief historical period since the 1960s, the legal
framework that shaped traditional marriage has also undergone
revolutionary change. First, legal support for hierarchical and dif-
ferentiated gender roles in marriage has been systematically
dismantled. Legal discrimination against women in employment,
education, and other public contexts, which reinforced the gender
disparity in marriage, has also been prohibited. During this same
period, no-fault divorce reforms removed most restrictions on di-
vorce. Finally, the sharp contrast between marriage and other
intimate relationships has blurred considerably, as legal protection
has been extended to cohabitation arrangements. In short, although
the legal landscape of marriage would not be unrecognizable to an
observer from mid-century, the scenery would be very different.
Much of the revolution in gender regulation can be understood
as an extension from race to gender of the principles of the civil
rights movement and its egalitarian legal reform. Sex discrimina-
tion in employment and education became the target of state and
federal legislation and has been the subject of successful constitu-
tional challenges as well.' In combination, these legal reforms
rights to establish paternity and collect child support); Unif. Parentage Act, 9B
U.L.A. 287 (1973 & Supp. 2000) (addressing paternity, presumptions of fatherhood,
and procedures for bringing an action to determine paternity); Paul K. Legler, The
Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30
Fain. L.Q. 519, 520-24 (1996); see also Ellman et al., supra note 58, at 1038-40
(discussing the Uniform Parentage Act that has been adopted in Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and
Wyoming).
,oo Moreover, characterization of parents as having a property-like interest in their
children has weakened considerably over the past century. See Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1041-51 (1992). This position is contestable, of course.
Increased divorce and out-of-wedlock childbirth suggests a weakening of parental
responsibility. However, as I suggest below, divorce is often justified as offering
benefits to children, and unmarried parents are held financially responsible for their
children's welfare.
10, See Title IX of the Education Amendments Acts, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681(a) (West
Supp. 2000) (prohibiting discrimination in education); Title VII of the Civil Rights
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invited women to move beyond the constraints of gendered family
roles and facilitated women's efforts to succeed in the public
sphere.
In the regulation of marriage itself, egalitarian legal reform took
the form either of abolishing privileges, entitlements, or restric-
tions that differentially affected husbands and wives, or of
extending them to both spouses. Thus, the marital rape exemption
has been abolished in most states, while eligibility for spousal sup-
port was extended to husbands who met the functional
requirements.1" Both parents are now liable for child support, and
both have authority to determine marital domicile. Neither is privi-
leged to physically "discipline" the other. Sometimes-as in the
case of abolition of the marital rape exemption and extension of
alimony to husbands-the determination to apply egalitarian prin-
ciples to marriage seems mostly to serve a symbolic function. °3
Other reforms-such as the enactment of equitable distribution
statutes, with their potentially broad redistributive effects-have
had important practical consequences. Not all the reforms have
benefited women. Replacing the tender years presumption with the
best interest standard created uncertainty about mothers' custody
claims and has been regretted by many feminists.1" The consistent
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment).
The Supreme Court has played an important role in prohibiting sex discrimination on
constitutional grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540 (1996)
(holding that the male-only admissions policy of a state-funded military academy
violates the Equal Protection Clause); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682
(1973) (holding that statutory classifications based on sex are inherently suspect).
12 See Liberta v. Kelly, 839 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1988). In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 283 (1979), the Supreme Court held that Alabama's statute, under which only
wives were eligible for alimony, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
13 Husbands in intact marriages are almost never charged with rape, absent serious
physical injury. See Ellman et al., supra note 58, at 176-78.
10, See Fineman, supra note 95, at 77-79, 82-83, 88-89 (arguing that the mother
should receive legal protection); Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen eds., Child
Custody and the Politics of Gender 133-36 (1989); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings:
Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 135, 154-58
(1992) (discussing male bias in decisionmaking in child custody proceedings and
favoring a maternal deference standard); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and
Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1415 (1991); Polikoff,
Gender And Child Custody Determinations: Exploding The Myths, in Families,
Politics And Public Policy: A Feminist Dialogue On Women and The State (Irene
Diamond ed., 1983); Scott, supra note 91, at 618-22; Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4-58 (1988).
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theme of these reforms has been a commitment by the state to
formal gender equality in marriage. Sometimes these legal devel-
opments seem to follow changes in social norms. The abolition of
the marital rape exemption is of this type. Sometimes, as in the
statutory reform favoring joint custody, they represent an aspira-
tional norm or simply a symbolic egalitarian statement.1
The no-fault divorce reforms have altered dramatically the ter-
mination of marriage in ways that may have influenced marital
behavior and weakened spousal commitment norms. Surprisingly,
the reformers who initiated this sweeping change had rather mod-
est objectives. There was no public clamor for reform of divorce
law; indeed contemporaneous surveys revealed public concern
about increasing rates of divorce."° The academics, practitioners,
and judges who initiated divorce reforms believed that the removal
of fault grounds would reduce the adversarial character of divorce
proceedings, and would also protect the proceedings' integrity,
which was threatened by collusion of couples who agreed that their
marriage had failed." The objective of the Governors' Commission
in California in the 1960s, which proposed a no-fault statute that
became a model for later reforms, was to modernize the process of
terminating marriage, while promoting reconciliation through
counseling." s The reform laws initially permitted divorce on the ba-
sis of a long separation or irretrievable breakdown, as determined
by the court or mutually recognized by the spouses."°
101 The trend in the 1980s toward favoring joint custody is an example of the legal
embodiment of an aspirational norm, since most parents do not share child caretaking
responsibility. See Scott, supra note 91, at 624-25. The availability of spousal support
to dependent husbands was for the most part of symbolic importance.
'06Surveys indicated minimal support for making divorce easier. A commonly
expressed view was that most people did not try hard enough to make marriage work.
See Herbert Jacob, Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the
United States 54-55 (1988); Scott, supra note 15, at 17-23.
,o Under these circumstances, collusion was encouraged by the requirement that
one spouse prove a fault ground against the other before divorce would be granted.
See Richard H. Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 Cornell L.Q. 303, 315-19
(1950) (describing fraudulent testimony in New York).10 In the California legislative process, the costly counseling provisions were
abandoned, and the statute was enacted without them. See Jacob, supra note 106, at
58,61.
101 See McKim v. McKim, 493 P.2d 868, 869-72 (Cal. 1972) (requiring irreconcilable
differences be shown before a divorce would be granted); Elayne Carol Berg, Note,
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The early no-fault reformers did not promote the revision of di-
vorce laws as social reform. And certainly they did not argue for
the redefinition of marriage as a relationship of casual commit-
ment. No-fault bills were treated as routine legislative business; for
the most part, they were processed without public hearings or press
coverage. ' Implicit in the reforms, however, was the recognition of
change in marital commitment norms and of the state's more cir-
cumscribed regulatory role. In abandoning fault, the reformers
acknowledged that the causes of marital failure are complex and
difficult for an outsider to evaluate. Moreover, marital breakdown
was understood to be often a matter of shared responsibility; thus,
assigning fault to one spouse was a simplistic distortion. The re-
forms also acknowledged implicitly that modern marriage had
become a more limited commitment, and that divorce should be al-
lowed not only on the basis of the other party's offense, but also on
grounds of relational failure. Moreover, the determination of mari-
tal failure did not need to be mutual. Early in the no-fault era,
courts routinely began to allow divorce on the basis of one party's
desire to be released from a marriage.111
The upshot of the reforms was the abolition of any legal en-
forcement of the marital commitment, and a transfer of the
authority to regulate the relationship from the state to the individ-
ual spouses. In a relatively short period of time, state coercion of
marital commitment was replaced by neutrality and by the parties'
freedom to terminate marriage at will. In most states, the legal
norm has become quick, easy, unilateral divorce, reinforced by
property division and spousal support policies facilitating "effi-
Irreconcilable Differences: California Courts Respond to No-Fault Dissolutions, 7
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 453,487-88 (1974).
110 See Jacob, supra note 106, at 50, 62-63, 66,102.
- In practice, the effect of statutes requiring a finding by a court that the marriage
is "irretrievably broken" is to authorize unilateral divorce. Most observers agree that,
in most states, divorce will be ordered on the petition of one spouse despite the
objection of the other, regardless of statutory language. See Ellman et al., supra note
58, at 198-207; Alan H. Frank et al., No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The
Nebraska Experience-An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58
Neb. L. Rev. 1, 65-66 (1978); Sass, The Iowa No-Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law
in Action, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 629 (1973); Berg, supra note 109. But see Amy L. Stewart,
Note, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 509 (1999)
(discussing the availability of unilateral divorce and noting that it was not formally
available in all states and often only in the cases in which an innocent spouse wanted a
divorce from a guilty spouse).
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cient" termination of marital obligations.'12 It appears that, having
rejected the legitimacy of state coercion under traditional law,
lawmakers determined that any legal enforcement of the marriage
contract was illegitimate. Thus, ironically, under the modem re-
gime, voluntary contractual agreements undertaken to reinforce
marital commitment are unlikely to be legally enforced.13 Only re-
cently, with the introduction of covenant marriage laws, have
couples been offered the option of legally binding commitments. '
Another development that has influenced the social meaning of
marriage is the legal recognition of non-marital cohabitation rela-
tionships. In many states, courts routinely enforce contractual
agreements of cohabiting parties regarding property division and
support upon termination of the relationship. Once the morality of
cohabitation no longer represented an obstacle, the primary prob-
lem for legal enforcement was determining the existence and terms
of the contract.' A few jurisdictions have gone further, suggesting
that legal obligations between cohabiting parties may arise simply
on the basis of the relationship or on equitable grounds.' 6 The legal
status of cohabitation relationships has been further recognized
under civil union and domestic partnership laws that extend bene-
112 This trend is also represented by the decline in permanent spousal support and
increase in short-term rehabilitative support, as well as a preference for division of
assets at the time of divorce. See Scott, supra note 15, at 18; Scott & Scott, supra note
4, at 1310-11.
"- Thus, for example, a provision in a premarital agreement providing for a two-year
waiting period before divorce would probably not be enforced. See Scott, supra note
15, at 21; supra note 2.
1See the discussion of covenant marriage as commitment device infra at Section
IV.C.2.
111 In Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976), the California Supreme Court
announced that express and implied contracts between unmarried couples regarding
property and support were enforceable. Many other courts have followed suit. See
Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) ("[U]nmarried cohabitants may
lawfully contract concerning property, financial, and other matters relevant to their
relationship."); In re Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) ("[Cjourts must 'examine
the... relationship and... make a just and equitable disposition of the property."')
(quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 554 P.2d 1057 (Wash. 1976)).
116 Marvin suggests that property transfers or support might be ordered on equitable
grounds, though later California decisions have retreated from this suggestion.
Washington, in theory, contemplates liability on the basis of cohabitation status-that
is, without contract-but courts have interpreted this narrowly. See Ellman et al.,
supra note 58, at 963-67.
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fits traditionally reserved for marriage to both homosexual and
heterosexual cohabiting couples.117
In sum, the legal regulation of marriage has undergone trans-
formative change in the past generation. The reforms progressed in
different doctrinal contexts without coordination, but at least two
related themes emerge. First, individuals are far freer to arrange
their intimate relationships without state coercion or even legal in-
tervention. Following the no-fault reforms, lawmakers have
declined to dictate commitment terms in marriage and have en-
dorsed a private ordering regime, but at the same time have
declined to enforce even voluntary marital commitment."' Second,
the state has embraced principles of equality, both between
spouses and between persons in families formalized by marriage
and those in other relationships. Modem legislatures and courts
have been less passive in regulating gender roles, systematically
promoting equality between spouses and discouraging differentia-
tion and hierarchy. Distaste for inequality, together with deference
toward individual choice, has stimulated the removal of legal
stigma from non-marital family relationships. Some of these re-
forms, such as the prohibition of gender distinctions, were the
product of a broad and coherent policy agenda, the goals of which
have been only modestly fulfilled. Others, like no-fault divorce law,
were narrower in their purpose, but have produced substantial,
largely unintended effects. Through a piecemeal process, the re-
forms have created modem legal marriage, a very different
relationship from its traditional version, but one in which, I will ar-
117 See id. at 977-86. Vermont has enacted a civil union statute, in response to a
Vermont Supreme Court decision, prohibiting state discrimination against gay
couples by withholding the privileges of marriage. See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91,
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/20OO/acts/act091.htm; Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999). France recently enacted a statute allowing couples to
legalize their "cohabitation" with a civil contract and receive some of the benefits of
married couples without the religious ties. See Kim Willsher, When Michel and
Philippe Got 'Married': A New French Law Is Allowing Gay Couples (and Straight
Couples Who Don't Like Religious Vows) To Get Officially Hitched, Evening
Standard (London), June 8, 2000, at 33.
m For a discussion of the trend toward private ordering, see Jana B. Singer, The
Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443. For a discussion of the
reluctance of courts to contractually enforce commitment provisions, see Haas, supra
note 2 ; Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 1327-32.
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gue in the next Part, gender and commitment continue to be linked
in subtle but important ways.
In striking contrast to the state's laissez-faire attitude toward
marriage, legal enforcement of parental obligations has expanded
in both scope and strength in recent years. Legal reforms imposing
responsibility on parents for the misconduct of their children effec-
tively hold parents liable for failure to perform child-rearing tasks
adequately. These laws represent an effort to strengthen parental
commitment norms, perhaps in response to a perception that they
are vulnerable and need reinforcement.119 Of broader importance
are the changes in legal policy toward children born to unmarried
women. These children now are entitled to the same rights to care,
support, and parental property as children whose parents are mar-
ried."i The primary effect of this change is to impose financial
support obligations on all fathers regardless of marital status,
obligations that are defined and enforced through a complex
network of federal and state child support regulations. The legal
reforms also have strengthened the obligations of non-custodial
divorced parents. Contrary to the predictions of some observers in
the 1980s, the general attenuation of family commitment in the no-
fault divorce era has not diminished responsibility for child sup-
port."' Indeed, there is evidence of a perceived need to justify the
freedom which modern divorce law gives parents. Thus, the move
to no-fault unilateral divorce has been justified on the ground that
-
9 Many modem curfew and truancy ordinances impose penalties on parents for
violations by their children. Many states also have more general statutes subjecting
parents to limited liability for their children's "criminal or delinquent acts." Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-919 (West 1999); see also, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1009
(1999); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-244 (Michie 2000). The parents of the victims of recent
school shootings are seeking to push the frontier of parents' legal responsibility in
lawsuits against the parents of the perpetrators. The theory of these cases is that these
parents were at least negligent for failure to recognize their children's psychological
distress or to supervise them adequately. See Belkin, supra note 98. Although the
prospect for success of these claims is highly uncertain, their plausibility represents a
change in attitude and a new openness to holding parents responsible for their
children's harmful conduct.
120 The Supreme Court has prohibited discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy. See
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 457, 465 (1988) (right to parental support); Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259, 261, 264-67 (1978) (inheritance rights).
121 See David L. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support,
80 Mich. L. Rev. 1614,1625 (1982).
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an unhappy marriage harms the psychological development of chil-
dren.'"
IV. LEGAL REFORM AND THE CHANGING
SOCIAL MEANING OF MARRIAGE
It is uncontroversial that the social norms regulating marriage
have changed, and it seems clear that the legal reform of tradi-
tional marriage has played a role in these changes. However,
claims about the extent of the law's influence and the precise
mechanisms that have effected change are necessarily speculative.
Moreover, the impact of family law on social norms seems to vary
in different contexts in ways that are rather puzzling. Sometimes,
formal legal expression of the desired behavior seems to have
promoted and reinforced normative change in a relatively straight-
forward way." Sometimes, however, the state's efforts seem to
have little impact, and sometimes those efforts produce unintended
effects.
Analysis of the interaction between legal reform and the evolu-
tion of spousal and parental norms over the past generation
suggests some underlying patterns. The state has functioned rather
well as a norm manager in reinforcing parental commitment
norms. On the other hand, legal change has had more limited ef-
fects on gender norms. Legal support of equality in marriage has
reinforced an egalitarian trend, but both men and women have
been reluctant to share parental responsibility. Finally, the law's in-
fluence on spousal commitment norms has been powerful, but in
my view, largely inadvertent. No-fault divorce laws, together with
the deprivileging of marriage, have undermined norms of marital
commitment.
My argument is that variation in the impact of legal change on
marital norms has much to do with the residual effects of norm
bundling, the intertwining of gender and commitment norms in
traditional marriage. The taxonomy of marital norms reveals that
as gender and commitment norms functioned within a formal regu-
2 See Scott, supra note 15, at 29.
,23 Many legal initiatives regulating parental obligation are in this category. I will
examine child support laws, but child labor laws and statutes requiring that children
wear safety restraints are other examples. See McAdams, supra note 13, at 407-08.
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latory framework, they gradually became intertwined. When norm
bundling occurs, disaggregation can be difficult. I suggested earlier,
for example, that the discrediting of gender hierarchy weakened
spousal commitment norms. This phenomenon also can impede le-
gal efforts to influence the evolution of a marital norm through
reforms that seek either to promote change in a disfavored norm or
to reinforce a favored norm. Historically, commitment norms and
gender norms were bundled within a legal regulatory framework
that cohesively defined traditional marital roles. Modem legal re-
formers seeking to shape marital norms-such as the proponents of
covenant marriage-must contend with the confounding effects of
this historic association.
Clarifying the role of norm bundling provides a purchase that fa-
cilitates better understanding of the impact of legal change on the
social norms regulating marriage. But predicting the impact of le-
gal initiatives remains a very uncertain business. Contemporary
marital and family norms are evolving in a polarized social context,
which inhibits the expression of private preferences. Preference
disguise makes prospective evaluation of the likely impact of legal
initiatives a speculative endeavor and inhibits the development of a
predictive theory.
A. Comparing the Effects of Legal Change on Parental
Commitment Norms and Gender Norms
The law has played its most effective role in both extending and
reinforcing norms of parental obligation over the past generation.
Children consistently have been the objects of benign paternalistic
intentions, and a broad societal consensus supports imposing re-
sponsibility on all parents for the care and development of their
children." Defections by parents generally are criticized harshly.
Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, when norm entrepreneurs publicized
data showing that many divorced fathers failed to pay child sup-
12This consensus reflects principled judgments about the fair allocation of the
burden of promoting children's welfare, as well as political self-interest, since parental
responsibility relieves society of a financial and care-taking burden. Opposition comes
from a few feminists, such as Martha Fineman, who would absolve fathers of
responsibility and impose the burden of financial responsibility on society. See
Fineman, supra note 95, at 211-19.
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port, defaulters were stigmatized as "deadbeat dads."'" The exten-
sion of this obligation to children of unmarried parents occurred
relatively seamlessly, bolstered by egalitarian values and sympathy
for these children as the innocent products of parental choices.'26
Analyzing the impact of these child support statutes on parental
norms offers some insight into the mechanisms by which law can
effectively influence social norms. First, there appears to have been
compatibility between the law's behavioral directives and a general
societal consensus about parents' financial obligation to support their
children. As easy divorce became more common and marital obliga-
tions more attenuated in the 1970s and 1980s, there was initially some
uncertainty about the parameters of parental responsibility and the
precise boundaries of acceptable behavior of non-custodial divorced
parents. Early in the no-fault period, legal enforcement of child
support obligations was lax."' Child support legislation expressed a
societal consensus that non-custodial parents continue to bear re-
sponsibility for their children and that the weakening of spousal
commitment norms did not extend to children. Beginning in the
mid-1980s, the federally mandated guidelines provided concrete
rules to quantify the obligation, and the vast interstate and federal
enforcement system powerfully reinforced informal mechanisms."
Informal enforcement alone is predictably inadequate in this con-
text because defecting parents can often escape sanctions from
spouses and the community. Without legal enforcement, the norm
would erode as defections went unpunished. However, as I have
suggested, some of the legal strategies to enhance parental respon-
sibility seem to have been tailored to stimulate norm
internalization and to employ informal community enforcement as
a supplement to formal sanctions.129
12 See, e.g., Patricia Avery, On the Trail of Those Deadbeat Dads, U.S. News &
World Rep., Mar. 21, 1983, at 70.
116The primary objective of the legislative focus on unmarried fathers, of course,
was financial. Congress enacted comprehensive legislation in the 1980s to locate
unmarried fathers and hold them accountable for child support, in part to relieve
government of the burden of supporting children in single-parent families. See
Eilman et al., supra note 58, at 1036-38.
117 See id. at 573-75.
I's See Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000).
129 The Virginia vehicle disabling policy mentioned above, supra note 60, may be the
most creative, but other states withdraw driving privileges and professional licenses,
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Furthermore, in the context of child support legislation, the
compatibility of the legal reform with the underlying parental
commitment norm was not undermined by its association with dis-
favored gender norms. Although gender norms in marriage
prescribed fathers' obligation of financial support, the legal en-
forcement of that obligation does not invoke association with
gender hierarchy; nor does it reinforce women's subordination. In-
stead, child support reduces mothers' dependency and lightens
their child-rearing burden. Thus, the effectiveness of this norm
management initiative can be attributed in part to the absence of
the confounding effects of norm bundling, as well as to the stability
of norms of parental obligation."
Compare the impact of legal reforms promoting egalitarian mar-
riage. Lawmakers have systematically withdrawn support from
gender hierarchy in marriage, and modem law offers an ideal of
marriage as an equal partnership of autonomous individuals.13' The
legal model of egalitarian marriage also implicitly discourages dif-
ferentiated roles. For example, replacing the tender years
presumption with the best interest standard amounts to a deregula-
tion of the maternal child care obligation. Some legislatures go a
step further, either basing custody on the division of parental re-
sponsibility during the marriage, 2 or endorsing joint custody and
sanctions that are likely to become known and to generate community gossip. See,
e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209D, § 3-305 (West 1998) (providing a wide array of
powers to tribunals of the commonwealth to withhold income, set aside property, and
"grant any other available remedy").
130 To test this proposition, consider a hypothetical policy initiative to promote the
welfare of children (and thus reinforce norms of parental obligation) by discouraging
parents from placing their children in day care-perhaps based on research evidence
that parental care is better for children. The policy could be a prohibition, imposition
of expensive, burdensome regulation that greatly increases the cost of day care, or the
removal of tax benefits. Such a policy is likely to evoke associations with traditional
coercive gender roles. The predictable response would be outrage.
13 Legal prohibions and sanctions have also directly targeted some behavior by
husbands-such as physical assault and rape-that was tolerated in traditional
marriage. The abolition of the marital rape exemption particularly stands as a
powerful statement endorsing the status of wives as autonomous agents. See Liberta
v. Kelley, 839 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988).
in See W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-11-206 (Michie 1999). West Virginia has legislatively
adopted the American Law Institute standard based on a model which I proposed and
designated the approximation standard. See Scott, supra note 91.
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thus encouraging parents to share child care responsibility."' More
subtly, modem divorce law discourages gender role differentiation
by denying wives who pursue traditional roles adequate insurance
against the risk of divorce."M These reforms together challenge tra-
ditional gender norms in marriage. If the legal initiatives were
effective, then gender equality in marriage should be well estab-
lished.
On one level, there has been remarkable progress toward egali-
tarian marriage. The endorsement of gender equality dominates
public discourse. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that
public support for equality in marriage is reflected in changed pri-
vate attitudes, and that distaste for patriarchy and for
subordination of wives is widespread. Casual empiricism suggests
that most people believe that husbands and wives are equal part-
ners in marriage. Nevertheless, role differentiation continues to be
evident in the division of marital obligations, most importantly in
the assignment of responsibility for children. In most families, both
mothers and fathers accept the norm that mothers bear primary re-
sponsibility for children.' Even women who have demanding jobs
tend to function as the managers of their children's lives, a role
most women do not wish to relinquish.'36 This leads, in turn, to ca-
reer choices that accommodate parenting duties, reinforcing
gender difference and women's dependency." Gendered parenting
norms continue to be internalized by mothers, self-enforced
through guilt, and reinforced by community expectations about pa-
rental behavior. The continued robustness of these norms remains
the primary impediment to fully developed norms of egalitarian
marriage.
133 See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
Dependency Dilemma, 2 Berkeley Women's L.J. 9,32-33 (1986).
13 Further, child support and alimony are awarded on a gender-neutral basis.
131 See Hochschild, supra note 91, at 152-55; Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Toward a
Family Policy: Changes in Mothers' Lives, in The Changing American Family and
Public Policy 157, 165-66 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed., 1988); Michael E. Lamb, The Role
of the Father: An Overview, in The Role of the Father in Child Development 1, 26
(Michael E. Lamb ed., 1976).
13 See studies cited in Scott supra note 91, at 656-60.
137 Joan Williams challenges the view that mothers make "choices" to make the
accommodations that seem necessary to adequately care for children. She argues that
the demands on the "ideal worker" force many women out of the work force or into
low-paying or part-time jobs. See Williams, supra note 29, at 6.
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The resistance to egalitarian parenting norms can be seen as a
function of two factors. First, gender norms that encourage moth-
ers to be primary caretakers are not inherently linked to hierarchy,
although they contribute to women's dependency, and ultimately
reinforce power imbalance in marriage. In this context, role differ-
entiation is not equated to subordination. Some feminists exalt the
maternal role as central to women's identity, and for many women,
child rearing is very rewarding."n
Resistance to norm change also can be understood as a function
of norm bundling. In traditional marriage, parental commitment
norms were deeply intertwined with gender norms. For women, be-
ing a good parent meant being a good mother, which meant taking
primary responsibility for children. Because these norms were tra-
ditionally bundled, and because norms of parental obligation have
continued to be robust during the recent period of social change,
mothers may be less responsive to legal reforms that support a new
norm of shared parenting. Because women have long internalized
the obligation to assume primary responsibility for their children's
care, gender norms regulating parenting may be more entrenched
and resistant to change than those that shape the spousal relation-
ship. The upshot is that, in this context, norm bundling undermines
legal efforts to promote change in parenting norms that have be-
come inefficient3 because these norms have long been associated
with other norms that continue to be strongly endorsed.
'Relational feminists have focused on women's identity as nurturing caretakers.
See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 159-60, 164, 167 (1993); Robin West, Caring for Justice 33-36 (1997);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 Fain. L.Q. 475, 476, 486-87
(1999). Indeed, claims about the importance of this role have been the basis of a
dispute in the feminist movement, with lesbian feminists and others objecting to the
notion that motherhood is an essential part of women's identity. See id. at 36-37. In
contemporary discourse, feminists who focus on motherhood do not tend to make
essentialist identity claims, but nonetheless, elevate mothering as a feminine role. See
Fineman, supra note 95, at 232-34.
131 Any argument that gendered parenting norms are efficient surely fails in a world
in which a high percentage of marriages end in divorce, leaving women without
adequate human capital to support themselves and their children.
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B. The Effects of Legal Change on Spousal Commitment Norms
1. Deregulation and Marital Commitment
Divorce law reforms of the past generation grew out of the per-
ception that the legal structure was out of step with other broader
values. The notion of a coercive state dictating that marriage be a
lifelong commitment, without regard to personal fulfillment, vio-
lated contemporary norms. However, no-fault divorce law did far
more than adjust legal regulation to express modern values of
marital commitment. It undermined and weakened these norms in
ways that have contributed to marital instability. The reforms were
not intended to express a dramatically revised vision of marriage as
a casual commitment, and most people do not view the relationship
in that way. Nonetheless, this is the account of marriage offered by
the modern legal regime, which facilitates easy termination of the
relationship while at the same time discouraging contractual com-
mitment. This account seems likely to affect the way people think
about marriage and the way they act.
One effect of the legal deregulation of marriage has been to
leave the boundaries of marital commitment undefined. Outmoded
fault grounds were once the concrete rules that prescribed both
behavioral expectations and also the conditions for excuse from the
obligations of marital commitment. These have been abolished, but
no rules have been substituted to provide direction (to spouses and
to other enforcers) about modern norms of commitment. The up-
shot of this deregulation is that the broad normative commitment
standard embraced by most individuals entering marriage is no
longer particularized by guidelines describing specific behavioral
expectations. Thus, for example, if relational failure justifies di-
vorce, what effort must be expended before declaring that the
relationship has truly failed? To what extent and in what ways are
the parties obliged to act so as to avoid marital failure? The ab-
sence of guidelines leaves each spouse to interpret whether his or
her behavior conforms to the now vaguely defined commitment
expectations. Predictably, the spouse who is tempted to defect may
be inclined to interpret the requirements to suit his immediate in-
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terest.' 4 The vagueness of the standard also undermines community
enforcement, since deciding whether any misbehavior or defection
constitutes a norm violation becomes less certain.
Deregulation has also removed legal enforcement as a mecha-
nism that strengthens spousal commitment norms. Under the no-
fault regime, substantial legal barriers to divorce have been re-
moved and the cost of exit from marriage has been lowered
significantly.' One effect of this legal change is that the precom-
mitment function of legal enforcement is lost to those spouses
whose long-term interest lies with marital stability and coopera-
tion. With deregulation of commitment, the couple must rely
exclusively on informal mechanisms to maintain-or restore-a
cooperative equilibrium. The dynamics of spousal interaction can
be intense, and conflict can escalate into a retaliatory pattern that
may be harder to reverse if exit is always an option. The threat of
instability is further exacerbated because each party knows the
other is also free to leave at any time. In contrast, the realization
that the traditional marriage relationship could not easily be aban-
doned may have encouraged both parties to avoid behaviors that
could lead them to confront the costly decision to divorce.4 '
If this analysis is correct, the deregulation of commitment under
no-fault law does more than serve the legitimate purpose of releas-
140 In this situation, the individual's short-term and long-term interests may conflict,
but because of a tendency to discount the future, she may overvalue short-term
interest. See Scott, supra note 15, at 68.
M See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text. The costs could include public
embarrassment of a fault proceeding, financial costs of litigation, and time costs,
particularly if divorce is granted on the basis of separation. For some spouses, the
costs would include a trip to Nevada and six weeks of residency. See Nelson Manfred
Blake, The Road to Reno: A History of Divorce in the United States 152-58 (1962).
At one time, informal social costs associated with loss of esteem in the community
would be added to these formal legal costs. Nelson Rockefeller's humiliation is a case
in point. See supra note 45.
42The incentive of parties in long-term relationships to cooperate explains the
popularity of mediation and other nonadversarial methods for resolving disputes in
on-going relationships. For example, in employment and divorce custody disputes, the
parties must continue to deal with each other, and are motivated to resolve disputes in
a way that allows future cooperation. It is possible, of course, that some people might
respond to barriers to exit by misbehaving, knowing that the partner cannot easily
leave. In traditional marriage, moreover, wives had more to lose if the marriage failed
and thus greater motivation to cooperate. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
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ing unhappy spouses from marriages that cannot be saved. It may
also destabilize relationships in which legal reinforcement of in-
formal norms could help spouses to achieve their goal of marital
fulfillment. The absence of clearly defined commitment expecta-
tions and the availability of easy exit weaken the norms that
encourage spouses to renew their efforts when stresses and tempta-
tions threaten the relationship. This may result in marital failure
for some couples whose marriages might have weathered hard
times if legal reinforcement of commitment norms were available
to deter defection. Thus, in an effort to correct an outmoded ex-
pression of commitment, the legal reforms inadvertently destroyed
a useful mechanism that encouraged mutually beneficial coopera-
tion for many parties.
On a societal level, no-fault divorce law arguably has weakened
commitment norms by making divorce easier and therefore more
common. Following the withdrawal of legal enforcement, the relative
(as well as the absolute) number of persons divorcing increased.14 It
can fairly be assumed that this number included both those who for-
merly would have been imprisoned in failed marriages and those for
whom the withdrawal of legal enforcement undermined marital
stability. In theory at least, as divorce became more common, sec-
ondary norms that promoted community enforcement weakened,
and enforcement became less effective. " This likely further weak-
ened commitment norms, which, in turn, contributed to greater
marital instability, leading to more divorce. Through such a spiraling
process, commitment norms could eventually unravel altogether. This
has not happened, of course. Nonetheless, contemporary divorce law
at least indirectly has undermined the effectiveness of informal en-
forcement of spousal commitment norms, and in this way contributed
to a weakening of the norms themselves.
143 Although divorce rates increased in the 1970s and 1980s during the period of no-
fault reforms, controversy surrounds the question of the extent to which the legal
reforms have contributed to the increase in divorce. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven
M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. Legal Stud. 869,879,887-92 (1994).
1" Divorce represents noncompliance with spousal commitment norms. As the
number of norm violators grows, enforcement costs grow, and community members
become less willing to enforce the norm through sanctions. The secondary norm
weakens because reputational benefits from enforcement decline. See Cooter, supra
note 13, at 1669-75; McAdams, supra note 13, at 393-94.
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2. Deregulation and the Signaling Effect of Marriage
Choosing marriage once signaled an election to undertake a se-
rious commitment to a lifelong relationship governed by clear
behavioral expectations. The signal carried by the marriage deci-
sion today is far more ambiguous. Because choosing marriage no
longer carries significant commitment costs, both those who desire
serious commitment and those who seek a more casual relationship
might reasonably select marriage.145 Moreover, premarital agree-
ments allow couples considerable latitude to customize the marriage
relationship so as to further reflect their individual preferences and
expectations. Finally, the differences between marriage and informal
unions are becoming less distinct. Individuals have considerable
freedom to exit in both types of intimate relationships. In both, the
parties can tailor their legal relationship contractually to limit or
extend relational obligations (other than making a binding com-
mitment). In both marriage and informal unions, couples may vary
in their behavioral expectations of one another.
The impact of these many changes is to dilute the quality of the
signal sent by a decision to marry. Individuals searching for lifelong
marriage partners have been deprived of one key means by which
they can indicate the seriousness of their desire to make an endur-
ing commitment to the relationship.146 They also have lost a tool for
evaluating whether prospective partners are similarly interested in
a lasting marriage. The pooling of individuals with different tastes
for commitment is likely to increase the incidence of inefficient
matching in the marriage market. In general, it may be uncertain
whether modern individuals entering marriage mean to be subject
to the obligations and behavioral expectations that traditionally de-
fined the relationship. Moreover, the power of marital status as a
signal to the community has become weaker as the line between
14 In signaling theory terms, the problem is that the signal has become too cheap
and is easily copied by those who would not be ready to bear the cost of a serious
commitment. Posner makes this point. See Posner, supra note 9, at 260-61.
146 In theory, the earnestly committed spouse could offer a bond by executing a
premarital agreement that provided for a favorable divorce settlement should she
defect. However, this might represent an enticement to a fortune seeker, and would
create incentives for opportunistic behavior on the part of the other spouse. More
promising would be mutual bonds, executed by both spouses. Currently, most such
agreements would be unenforceable. See supra notes 113,118 and accompanying text.
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marriage and informal cohabitation has blurred. Community moni-
toring and sanctioning of spousal misbehavior become difficult if
behavioral expectations vary across marriages and no clear stan-
dards of marital obligation exist."
It would be inaccurate to suggest that for most people marriage
no longer functions as a signal of serious intentions, or that mar-
riage and informal unions are interchangeable in the extent to
which they are regulated by commitment norms. Individuals seek-
ing enduring commitment in an intimate relationship continue to
choose marriage over cohabitation, and couples in informal unions
marry at the point when they are ready to undertake a greater
commitment. Social science data show clearly that cohabitation re-
lationships are both less stable and less satisfying than marriage.'48
In part, this is due to self-selection, as those persons who believe
that greater personal fulfillment will come from a lasting relation-
ship are willing to bear the (now reduced) marginal costs of
compliance with marital norms. What has changed as a result of
the legal reforms is the power of the signal. Modern marital law of-
fers individuals only a very modest opportunity to make a credible
commitment, and thus choosing marriage no longer signals inten-
tions or triggers expectations as reliably as it once did.
C. Norm Management: Legal Reinforcement of
Spousal Commitment Norms
1. The Theoretical Case for Norm Reform
A few lessons about norm management emerge from the recent
reforms in family law. First, the experience with no-fault reforms
suggests that deregulation can be as important as regulation in in-
fluencing the evolution of norms. Deregulation is most likely to have
the effect of undermining existing norms for which the abolished rules
provided reinforcement. Another lesson is that seemingly unrelated
legal changes to a complex institution can have amplified and often
14The weaker the signal, the less reputational benefit it carries, either for the
spouse (to the community) or for community members seeking reputational benefit
through enforcement.
"4' See Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16
J. Faro. Issues 53, 73 (1995); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 Demography
483,485 (1995).
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unintended effects. The combined impact of privatization reforms
in multiple family law contexts plausibly has been to destabilize
marriage, though none of the reforms had this purpose.
If family law reforms have inadvertently undermined spousal
commitment norms, the question becomes whether lawmakers can
act as norm managers to correct the problem by providing couples
with effective means to strengthen marital commitment. "Effec-
tiveness" would be measured by the readiness of couples to utilize
the legal mechanisms and the actual impact of these mechanisms
on commitment norms. A further consideration is whether such le-
gal options can be structured so as not to undermine other
important legal and normative objectives.
In theory, the option of legally enforceable commitment would
seem to provide a useful tool to individuals contemplating a long-
term, intimate relationship. The evidence that marriages are both
more stable and more satisfying than cohabitation arrangements
suggests that many couples may benefit from the availability of a
distinctive marriage option. By differentiating marriage with legal
commitment from other unions, such an option would embody a
clearer signal of commitment, thus facilitating better matching of
individuals at the outset of a relationship. Indeed, a modem com-
mitment option, created in a context in which other intimate
relationships are socially acceptable alternatives, should function
as a more accurate signal than did traditional marriage.149
A marriage commitment option expands the available relation-
ship choices and thus is wholly compatible with modem values of
personal autonomy. This point deserves elaboration, because the
deregulation of marital commitment that is embodied in easy exit
policies is often mistakenly understood to be a necessary incident
of contemporary law's deference to personal autonomy in intimate
relationships. Although moralistic legal restrictions on intimate re-
lationships would be discordant in the modem context, legal
passivity is not the only alternative to the coercive policies that are
now discredited. State coercion and state enforcement of voluntar-
ily assumed legal obligations are quite different actions. As is well
understood in the realm of commercial contracts, legal enforce-
ment expands rather than restricts individual autonomy. To be
149 See supra Section III.B.
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sure, legal enforcement limits "ex post autonomy," or the freedom
of individuals to renege on their promises." But what is lost under
modem divorce law is "ex ante autonomy" or the freedom to
commit. Since the freedom to commit includes the freedom to
choose not to commit, ex ante autonomy is the more robust con-
ception of personal freedom. The law of contract is based on this
premise."'
A commitment option may also generate social value beyond the
benefit to parties choosing legal marriage. The financial security,
emotional support, and mutual care that marriage partners provide
to one another over time potentially reduce the burden on society.
In this sense, society has a stake in the stability of marriage, one
that becomes more substantial in marriages with minor children.
As spousal commitment norms become weaker, parents may end
marriages that are only moderately unhappy.52 Empirical social
science studies that examine the impact of divorce on the adjust-
ment and development of children consistently indicate that this
trend is worrisome. The research offers little support for the con-
ventional justification of divorce as a move that usually promotes
the welfare of the affected children. For most children, divorce has
a harmful impact on their future social integration, educational and
occupational attainment, and psychological well-being. The unset-
tling headline is that unless the level of conflict between parents is
intense, most children would be better off if their unhappy parents
stayed married. The research findings put unconstrained parental
'
5o Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 1246-47. Ex post autonomy receives maximum
protection under current divorce law, which functionally prohibits the freedom to
commit.
5 See id.
m Thus, as spousal commitment norms weaken and are not enforced, the costs of
exit decline, and the threshold of unhappiness that leads one spouse (or both) to
terminate marriage may decline. Paul Amato and Alan Booth make this point in their
large-scale study of the impact of divorce on children. See Paul R. Amato & Alan
Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of Family Upheaval 11 (1997).
UsAmato and Booth concluded that 20% of the children in their study were in high-
conflict families. See id. Mavis Hetherington and her colleagues observed that
children in divorced families functioned worse than those in intact families at two
months and one year, but had improved substantially by two years after divorce. Girls
were more compliant than boys. In a six-year follow up, boys in divorced families
continued to be less compliant than boys in intact families. See E. Mavis Hetherington
et al., Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage on the Adjustment of Children,
24 J. Am. Acad. Child Psychiatry 518, 527 (1985); see also E. Mavis Hetherington et
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choices in a more negative light. At a minimum, the data suggests
that commitment mechanisms that promote marital stability in
marriages with children may have broader social utility.
2. Covenant Marriage as a Norm Management Initiative
Covenant marriage statutes, such as the recent enactments in
Louisiana and Arizona, offer an option for reinforcing spousal
commitment norms." 4 Couples who choose covenant marriage over
marriage regulated by conventional no-fault divorce law agree to
premarital counseling and to divorce only upon the establishment
of fault or after a significant period of separation. No other basis
for divorce is available. The most important features of covenant
marriage are the foreclosing of easy exit from marriage, even by
contemporaneous agreement, and the separation period, which is
usually two years. 5s Although critics have targeted covenant mar-
riage as the revival of fault, Louisiana, at least, has never
abandoned fault grounds in its divorce law, but simply added a no-
fault option.56 Thus, statutory authority to bring divorce claims on
fault grounds is not an innovation.
The legislative movement to promote covenant marriage stat-
utes might be seen as heralding the emergence of a new norm of
marital commitment. By choosing covenant marriage, prospective
spouses can signal their serious intentions to each other and to the
community. The availability of covenant marriage may facilitate
matching, because it provides real options based on level of com-
mitment and encourages the couple to disclose information about
their aspirations to one another." The restrictions on divorce pro-
al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in Nontraditional Families: Parenting
and Child Development 233 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982) (noting that custodial
mothers were less communicative and affectionate with their children and more
inconsistent and less effective in setting limits than were mothers in intact families,
and that custodial mothers particularly had problems dealing with their sons).
- See supra note 1. Legislatures in more than 20 states are considering covenant
marriage bills. See Americans for Divorce Reform, Covenant Marriage Links, at
http://www.divorcereform.orgtcov.html (last visited Sept. 27,2000).
U See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-903 (West 2000); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307 (West
2000).
'1 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 103 (West 1999).
,S, It seems plausible that some couples might have revealing conversations with one
another about whether they should undertake covenant marriage. Modem covenant
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vide concrete rules clarifying behavioral expectations for commit-
ment. Although, as Robert Scott and I have argued, basing divorce
on fault grounds is problematic,"' the mandatory separation period
usefully establishes the extent of spousal effort required before the
relationship can be abandoned.159 This obstacle to divorce functions
as a precommitment mechanism directly by discouraging defection;
it also reinforces norms promoting cooperation in marriage. Wide-
spread election of covenant marriage could reduce the incidence of
divorce, which in turn could independently strengthen commitment
norms.
3. Impediments to Norm Management: The Bundling Effect
Although covenant marriage appears promising as a legal
mechanism to reinforce marital commitment norms, it is unclear
whether it will function effectively in the contemporary setting.
Moreover, the impediments to success suggest some formidable
obstacles that confront legal efforts at norm management in this
context. First, legislatures considering covenant marriage face a
challenge setting terms of commitment that will function effec-
tively as a signal without threatening contemporary values of
equality and tolerance. Covenant marriage, like any signal, pur-
ports to separate the reliable, committed types who choose this
option from the more shallow ones who do not. To be effective, the
signal must be sufficiently costly to deter those whose commitment
is tentative. If it is not, a pooling equilibrium is possible, in which
everyone chooses covenant marriage, even those who do not have
serious intentions, in order to secure the reputational benefits from
the signal. Alternatively, if the signal is perceived as costly by the
less committed types and is selected only by the most committed
types, it risks stigmatizing those who do not choose covenant mar-
marriage may be a more effective signal than traditional marriage because coercion
and stigma will not affect the choice.
'-s See Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 1326-32. Basing divorce on fault is problematic
for several reasons. Marital failure is usually a matter of joint responsibility, and one
party's conduct that constitutes fault may be a retaliation in response to the other
party's defection. Even if one party has defected, a third party factfinder may be
unable to accurately evaluate responsibility in the context of a complex and private
relationship. Finally, under covenant marriage statutes, fault grounds may be used
strategically to facilitate a quick divorce that evades the separation period.
'5 See Scott, supra note 15, at 76-77.
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riage. This risk is inherent in any reform that elevates the status of
marriage over other unions or family groups. Thus, an inherent
tension exists between privileging marriage as a distinctive status in
order to induce a separating equilibrium, and promoting tolerance
regardless of family status."
The impact of a covenant marriage statute (or of any other norm
management reform) depends on the social meaning that the re-
form comes to assume."6' On the one hand, if covenant marriage is
viewed as inconsistent with modem values-as an effort to revive
the disfavored marital norms of an earlier era-it likely will not be
widely chosen and will have little impact. On the other hand, cove-
nant marriage may be seen as usefully offering persons who want
commitment in marriage the means to find partners who share this
goal and to reinforce their relationship. Although the attitudes of
many Americans toward marriage might suggest that the latter
scenario is more likely, the former is also possible. Public opinion,
editorial commentary, and media reaction to early covenant mar-
riage legislation have been mixed, suggesting that the response may
be complicated by contemporary social currents and influenced by
deep historical associations. 2 For many people, aspirations for last-
ing marriage coexist with a deep distrust of legal enforcement of
marital commitment.
What explains the distaste for legally enforceable marital com-
mitment, even in the relatively innocuous form of the existing
110 Another limitation on the effectiveness of covenant marriage from a signaling
perspective is suggested by Eric Posner. The availability of several marriage options
dilutes the signal conveyed. If covenant marriages, conventional marriages, and
customized marriages structured contractually all exist in a society, community
members either will have to differentiate among marriages in enforcing norms or will
have limited behavioral expectations. This may dilute the effectiveness of
enforcement. See Posner, supra note 9, at 272. The problem may not be as serious as it
seems, however, because the most effective community enforcers are those who know
the couple best. This group is more likely to be informed about the level of
commitment.
-61 See Lessig, supra note 84, at 956-61.
16 The national media response to covenant marriage has been relatively hostile,
particularly among liberal and feminist commentators. See infra notes 163-166, 168.
Many participants in a Louisiana survey, however, responded positively to the option,
particularly to the premarital counseling provisions. It is difficult to predict whether
attitudes in Louisiana are representative, since it is a state with conservative social
attitudes. See James D. Wright et al., Covenant Marriage: Louisiana Update,
Responsive Community, Fall 1998, at 86.
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covenant marriage statutes? Many of the objections are curious
and do not withstand close inspection."'3 Legal enforcement of
marital commitment is apparently understood by critics as gov-
ernment coercion."6 Its choice-enhancing properties are ignored,
even where (as with covenant marriage) it is voluntarily chosen by
the parties from a menu of options. Some feminists have articu-
lated strong opposition, seeing constraints on divorce as a threat to
women's freedom to escape unhappy marriages." Although critics
argue that covenant marriage (and restrictions on divorce generally)
will trap women in abusive marriages, surely legal mechanisms could
be constructed to protect against this risk." Moreover, marriage
breakdown usually inflicts greater costs on women than on men.
This anxiety points to a deeper resistance to legal enforcement
of spousal commitment. Although, in theory, spousal commitment
norms can be dis-aggregated from gender norms, a strong associa-
tion continues between the two sets of norms that structured the
traditional marriage relationship. Over a long period of time,
within the unifying legal framework of traditional marriage, com-
mitment norms and gender norms became bundled, perhaps
inextricably. In my view, the legal regime of coercive restrictions
on marriage forged a bond between these two sets of norms, which
interacted in apparent harmony, powerfully reinforcing each other
to collectively shape marital behavior.67 Over the last generation, it
has been widely understood that gender subordination was coer-
cively imposed on women, most powerfully by the traditional legal
"'Some argue that legal enforcement is unnecessary to reinforce marital
commitment. If this means that informal norms are presumed sufficient, it is factually
incorrect for many marriages. Other critics raise the traditional objection that divorce
is better for children. See Lynne Z. Gold-Bikin, Let's Eliminate the Idea of Covenant
Marriage, Chi. Trib., Sept. 7,1997, § 13, at 9.
'14 See John McCarthy, ACLU Says Proposed Marriage Law Intrusive, Clev. Plain
Dealer, Sept. 3,1997, at B2.
" See Katha Pollitt, What's Right about Divorce, N.Y. Times, June 27,1997, at A3.
'16See Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "For the Sake of the Children": A
Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1435, 1443-46 (1992) (criticizing
Scott's proposal, predating covenant marriage reforms, which included a mandatory
waiting period before divorce). A straightforward response to an abusive spouse is
legal separation with spousal support, if appropriate, together with an injunctive
restraining order.
167Although privately many wdmen must have objected to their subordinated status,
a strong public consensus favored gender hierarchy and silenced private objections.
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regime. Support for gender equality has come to dominate public
discourse. In this climate, legal enforcement of commitment (such
as covenant marriage) threatens to resurrect discredited spousal
gender norms, and is viewed with deep distrust." Such policies, in
this view, are tainted by their long association with legal enforce-
ment of gender hierarchy.169
The suspicion that legal enforcement of spousal commitment
creates the threat of resurrecting gender hierarchy is not wholly
groundless. Gender equality in marriage is far from firmly estab-
lished. Gender roles continue to be differentiated and still tend to
restrict the freedom of wives more than that of husbands. Thus, the
reintroduction of legally enforceable commitment raises the spec-
ter of restrictions on women's tenuous autonomy in marriage.
More concretely, as the expressed concerns about spousal abuse
suggest, legal commitment threatens to bind some women to rela-
tionships grounded in patriarchal domination. Although spousal
commitment norms are endorsed, the endorsement is often quali-
fied by the preference for ex post autonomy. What remains is a
very thin conception of commitment.
Some feminists hold that marriage is so contaminated by its tra-
ditional patriarchal gendered structure that it should be abolished,
or at least given no special legal recognition. Thus, Martha Fine-
man argues that the law should protect and privilege the mother-
child dyad as the core family group, and leave intimate adult rela-
tionships to the realm of contract.' ° Many feminists, however,
recognize the value of marriage as a stable, potentially fulfilling re-
lationship that can serve the interests of women and children as
well as men. 7' For these scholars, the project is to promote equality
' See Terry A. O'Neill, This Law Hurts Women, USA Today, Aug. 14, 1997, at
A14. O'Neill, president of the Louisiana chapter of NOW, argues that covenant
marriage "support[s] a fundamentalist, patriarchal vision of marriage." Id. She also
argues that men will find it easier to exit covenant marriage than women, and that the
barriers to exit will harm victims of domestic violence.
'9 Although spousal commitment norms have eroded somewhat generally, in part
due to norm bundling, they continue to be endorsed as long as they are not subject to
legal enforcement.
17See Fineman, supra note 95, at 226-36.
171 See Williams, supra note 29, at 1-4; Bartlett, supra note 138, at 486-87; Katharine
B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 65,100-
11 (1998).
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in marriage, either through egalitarian family roles or through legal
protection of women who undertake differentiated roles." Most of
these scholars, as well as many feminists in the public arena, would
reject legally enforceable commitment as regressive, although
many would generally endorse the value of marital commitment if
untainted by gender."
Concern about the lingering association between gender and
commitment norms is not alleviated by the debate about marriage
and family policy in the political arena. In truth, many modern reli-
gious and cultural conservatives would like to return to an earlier
era of both stable marriage and patriarchal gender roles. Some of
these observers explicitly link family instability and the lamented
decline of "family values" to the abandonment by women of their
domestic roles. 4 Social conservatives advocate coercive legal in-
tervention in service of the moral agenda of revitalizing the
traditional family, by opposing abortion17 and day care and by re-
viving legal restrictions on divorce. Many conservatives have
embraced covenant marriage statutes, albeit a little reluctantly, as a
politically viable means of restricting divorce."' In this politically
charged setting, the prospects for disaggregation of spousal gender
and commitment norms, and the neutral evaluation of legal poli-
cies that offer the option of marital commitment seem very remote.
Recognizing the residual impact of norm bundling provides a ba-
sis for informed speculation about the success or failure of family
law reforms in shaping social norms, and may be useful in ex post
explanations. The experience with family law reform suggests that
norm bundling can play a role both in legal efforts to strengthen an
172 See Williams, supra note 29, at 5-6; Bartlett & Stack, supra note 133, at 28-33;
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead?: Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J.
2227,2246-47 (1994).
17 See Silbaugh, supra note 171, at 142-43; O'Neill, supra note 168; Pollitt, supra
note 165.
174See Patrick J. Buchanan, Right from the Beginning 149, 341 (1990); Jerry Falwell,
Listen, America 124-25 (1979).
175See Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 138, 145 (1984)
(describing a study showing that conservative women in traditional family roles
oppose abortion in part because it threatens their life choices).
176 The Louisiana Covenant Marriage statute was a compromise between those who
wanted to return to traditional fault grounds divorce and more moderate forces. See
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 63 (1998).
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existing norm and in efforts to promote norm change. Thus, legal
efforts to reinforce useful but threatened norms-in this case,
those of spousal commitment-may be undermined by the strong
historic association of those norms with once-powerful but cur-
rently unpopular norms-in this case, those enforcing gender
hierarchy. Norm bundling may also impede legal reform designed
to promote normative change when a norm that is no longer effi-
cient has long been linked to one that remains robust. This may
explain the slow pace toward egalitarian parental roles, despite le-
gal support for normative change. In contrast, some efforts at norm
management are not undermined by the residual effects of norm
bundling. Recent government efforts to reinforce parental commit-
ment norms, for example, have not been impeded by associations
with unpopular or obsolete norms.
This insight suggests a strategy for legal reinforcement of marital
commitment that might be effective in avoiding negative bundling
effects (and indeed in utilizing norm bundling to promote positive
associations). Legal reforms that explicitly link spousal commit-
ment with parental commitment might fare better than existing
covenant marriage legislation." The accumulating evidence about
the harmful impact of divorce on children undermines a key justifi-
cation for parental freedom to leave unhappy marriages. If this
information becomes well known, it may affect attitudes about di-
vorce. 8 Given the continued robustness of parental commitment
norms, it is plausible that new behavioral expectations for parents
who are unhappy in their marriage (and a new norm) may emerge.
("If you have children, you should not give up on your marriage
until you have tried long and hard to make it work.") These
changes could create greater receptivity to legal initiatives that re-
inforce the emerging norm. For example, marriages involving
minor children could be subject to more extensive separation peri-
117 Lessig suggests that a strategy to influence social meaning is to tie the desired
new meaning to an established social meaning that will have influence by association.
This technique, known as "tying," has been used frequently, for example, in
endorsement advertising. As Lessig explains, when Michael Jordan endorses Nike
shoes "some of his social capital is transferred to the product endorsed, and the
meaning of wearing Nike shoes changes." See Lessig, supra note 84, at 1009-10.
I'lRichard McAdams points out that one contributor to norm change is new
information which casts doubt on the desirability of the old norm. See McAdams,
supra note 13, at 395-96.
2000] 1965
Virginia Law Review
ods under covenant marriage statutes (or covenant marriage could
be limited to this group).
At most, these observations constitute a first tentative step in an
explanatory theory of the impact of law on the social norms regu-
lating the complex institution of marriage. It is unclear whether
these observations can be generalized to other norm settings. Even
in the marital context, a careful examination of the effects of norm
bundling does not permit confident predictions about the likely
impact of proposed legal initiatives on social norms. As I discuss in
the next section, a major obstacle to constructing a predictive the-
ory is the difficulty in discerning ex ante the intrinsic preferences of
people who will be affected by the law.
4. Disguised Preferences and the Problem of
Prediction in Norm Management
Predicting the impact of legal reforms is complicated by the
phenomenon of disguised preferences-gaps between expressed
public opinion and private preferences.179 Preference disguise is
likely t6 occur to a certain extent in many norm contexts. The very
existence of a norm prescribing certain behavior will tend to gen-
erate both compliance and public expressions of support, because
of a desire to avoid the reputational costs associated with non-
compliance. Thus, the wife who hates child care and housework
may conform to her prescribed role for fear of criticism, not ac-
knowledging publicly her distaste. Moreover, if she violates "good
mother" norms, community members may publicly sanction her to
signal their endorsement of the norm, even if they privately are
neutral about the behavior."s The upshot is that social pressure to
conform to norms may obscure variations in private preferences
and distort the apparent strength of the norm.
179 Much of the analysis of disguised preferences is drawn from the insightful model
of social change developed by Timur Kuran. See Kuran, supra note 11, at 174, 177-78,
347. Kuran seeks to explain why social change sometimes occurs rapidly, and
sometimes slowly through an evolutionary process. He explains the important role in
this process of the tendency of individuals to falsify preferences in response to social
pressure. See id. at 247, 256.
110 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of secondary
enforcement norms.
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Preference disguise not only occurs when there is a dominant
norm which many people dislike. It also arises when public opinion
is polarized on a sensitive topic and competition develops over ap-
propriate attitudes and behavior. In recent years, family roles and
values have become a battleground in a culture war, with social
and religious conservatives battling liberals and feminists to define
family roles and norms.18' Each side attempts to dominate public
discourse and to impose costs on the expression of attitudes with
which they disagree. In this environment, candid expression of pri-
vate preferences becomes more costly, and preference disguise can
be expected. It is generally assumed that most people have more
complex and less polarized views on gender roles, divorce, abor-
tion, and other sensitive family law topics than those reflected in
public discourse."
Predictions about the success of any legal initiative that impli-
cates these issues are highly uncertain. Consider covenant
marriage, for example. I have suggested that norm bundling ap-
pears to influence responses to this reform. At this point, the
extent of that influence is hard to assess or predict, in part because
private preferences are likely varied and hard to measure."n Indi-
viduals considering marriage may perceive covenant marriage as a
coercive political initiative by those with a "family values" agenda.
Alternatively, the legislation may be taken to legitimate a norm
that had seemed to be in decline, emboldening those who secretly
regretted this trend. A range of responses is plausible, and, ex ante,
people may not be forthright about private preferences.' A fur-
ther complication is that, in this polarized political and social
environment, individual decisions may be affected by perceived
costs or benefits of association with the public supporters or oppo-
l See James Davison Hunter, Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for
Democracy in America's Culture War 3-11,114-21 (1994).12 See, e.g., id. at 10, 85-90.
1
3 In Louisiana, for example, there is some evidence that private opinion about
covenant marriage is more positive than the public debate would suggest. See Wright
et al., supra note 162.
"1 Some people may privately prefer traditional marital roles and be emboldened by
the statute to act on those preferences. Others might take the enactment of the statute
to express a modem egalitarian commitment norm, which is compatible with their
preferences. For others, legal commitment may generate anxiety or disdain, because
of its traditional associations or because of enthusiasm for personal freedom.
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nents of legislation."s For example, if covenant marriage is identi-
fied with conservative Christian proponents, moderates who might
otherwise choose this commitment option may fear that its social
meaning is "contaminated," and that they will be sanctioned by the
social group with which they identify." If public opinion moves in
one direction or another, that itself may influence preferences, and
it will certainly influence willingness to express preferences. The
extent to which reputational concerns influence choices will vary,
of course, depending on the intensity of the private preferences
and the extent of the perceived reputational effect."
The key point is that, in assessing the likely impact of legal initia-
tives that implicate "family values," we are disabled from making
confident predictions. We have no clear picture of the pattern of
private preferences that could affect decisions about covenant mar-
riage, or the extent to which these preferences are disguised in
public discourse. Thus, predicting the decisions that people will make,
and more broadly the impact of the legislation, becomes an uncertain
business. Attitude surveys can provide some information,'" but sur-
veys are not effective at gauging intensity of preferences, or the point
at which individuals would express a different preference (or make a
different decision) in response to shifts in public opinion that alter
reputational costs."s The framework developed in this Essay may
I's Recall that no-fault divorce reform was enacted with little public discussion or
controversy, perhaps making the decisions of unhappy spouses less subject to concern
about reputational effects. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
'6 Cokie and Steven Roberts describe how opinion about covenant marriage has
become polarized because of the support for the Louisiana law by religious
conservatives. They suggest that liberals oppose the law, not on the merits, but
because of its supporters. See Cokie Roberts & Steven Roberts, Louisiana's New
'Covenant Marriage' Law Makes Good Sense, Salt Lake Trib., Aug. 31,1997, at AA3.
In Oklahoma, a covenant marriage bill was supported by many members of the state
legislature because they feared reprisals from the Christian Coalition. See Brian Ford,
"I Really Do," Tulsa World, Feb. 22,1999, at 1.
"I Kuran explains how these factors can combine to result in seemingly rapid shifts
in public opinion as people become willing to express preferences that they previously
disguised. See Kuran, supra note 11, at 247,256.
'" See Laura Sanchez et al., Setting the Clock Forward or Back: Covenant Marriage
and The Divorce Revolution, 22 J. Fam. Issues (forthcoming Apr. 2001).
8 See Kuran, supra note 11, at 35-38. Thus, if choosing covenant marriage were to
become a widely endorsed signal of marital commitment, those whose intrinsic
preferences were mildly negative might either actually become more positive (as
public opinion influenced their intrinsic preferences) or choose covenant marriage
despite continued reservations because of concern about reputational harm. Those
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assist the project of (tentative) explanation and interpretation of
the influence of legal reforms on the evolution of social norms in
this context. It does not provide the means to predict with any con-
fidence what will be the consequences of any given legal change.
D. Summary
An analysis of the dialectical relationship between recent family
law reforms and evolving social norms regulating marriage suggests
that two factors affect the impact of a legal innovation~on the evo-
lution of any particular norm. First, the degree to which norms are
bundled may be important, specifically the degree to which a target
norm is associated with a favored or disfavored norm. Second, the
success of a legal reform may depend on the coincidence between
the legal prescription and community opinion. Legal initiatives that
deviate substantially from an emerging community consensus or
that appear to support other disfavored norms are unlikely to have
substantial impact on the target norm. Lawmakers can misjudge
community values and preferences because they are subject to in-
terest group pressure," or because public opinion distorts private
preferences. Under these conditions, the new rule will get little in-
formal community enforcement, and predictably will be subject to
evasion or disapproval.
whose intrinsic preferences were intensely negative might continue to resist. Timur
Kuran discusses the complex relationship between the intensity of intrinsic
preference, changes in reputational costs, and changes in expressed preferences. See
id.
190 For example, reforms favoring joint physical custody failed to influence behavior
because they apparently were inconsistent with the private preferences of parents
regarding custodial arrangements. These laws expressed support for equal sharing of
child care responsibility, but the predicted role change has not occurred. Joint custody
advocates in the 1980s (mostly fathers' groups) lobbied for the passage of statutes
favoring joint custody. Women's groups opposed them, arguing that joint custody was
a windfall for fathers, since in most families mothers were primary caretakers before
divorce. See Scott, supra note 91, at 626-27; Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn,
Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455, 456-62 (1984). Robert Mnookin and
Eleanor Maccoby's study of parents with joint custody showed that joint custodial
arrangements tend to drift toward more traditional residential arrangements,
suggesting that, once the divorce proceedings were behind them, both mothers and
fathers preferred arrangements in which mothers had primary child care
responsibility. See Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child:
Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody 167-70,267-70 (1992).
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Despite these impediments, legal change can influence both the
pace and direction of normative change. Individuals vary in the ex-
tent to which they are ready to tolerate the reputational costs of
challenging existing norms. For each individual, this will depend on
how much the norm distorts private preferences, the level of an-
ticipated sanctions for violation, and the value of acting honestly
on preferences.19" ' As I have suggested, norm entrepreneurs may
advocate for new norms, encouraging others to express and act on
their intrinsic preferences. A legal rule expressing the new norm
can act as a catalyst and may be embraced by those whose intrinsic
preferences it reflects. If many individuals were silenced by the old
norm, rapid norm change may occur. Prediction is highly uncertain,
however, because the extent of private dissatisfaction with the old
norm and the readiness of individuals to risk censure for violation
may be impossible to measure ex ante.
CONCLUSION
This account of the relationship between family law and the so-
cial norms surrounding marriage is a cautionary tale for norms
scholars. Although the story suggests that legal reforms can influ-
ence social norms, it does not offer much encouragement to those
who are attracted to the idea of norm management as a legal policy
tool. This Essay is a first step toward a comprehensive understand-
ing of the interaction between law and social norms in the
regulation of the most complex of human relationships-marriage.
Studying that relationship during a period of dramatic change in
both the legal and normative regulatory framework yields some in-
sights about the intricate interaction between these two regulators
of human behavior. It also reveals how much we have to learn
about the mechanisms by which law influences norms in the mari-
tal context.
191 See Kuran, supra note 11, at 35-38.
